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ABSTRACT 
 
Carbon emissions reduction has been the center of attention in many organizations 
during the past few decades. Many international entities developed rules and regulations to 
monitor and control carbon emissions especially under supply chain context. Furthermore, 
researchers investigated techniques and methods on how reduce carbon emissions under 
operational adjustment which can be done by cooperation or coordination. The main 
contribution of this thesis is to measure to what extend cooperation can contribute to carbon 
emissions. Many research addresses the advantage of cooperation in reducing cost. 
However, there isn't a plenty of research addressing the effect of cooperation on carbon 
emissions when the incentive of the cooperation is to reduce cost only. The aim of this 
thesis is to show if joint replenishment leads to a reduction in carbon emissions and this to 
be considered as an advantage to be added to cooperation. Moreover, if a savings occur 
from cooperation, the aim will be to address the issue of allocating the savings among 
parties engaged in the coalition. 
The thesis methodology adapted and extended cooperative EOQ model and basic 
inventory model (EOQ) in order to formulate and build an adjusted model to measure 
carbon emissions. The adjusted model will be used to calculate carbon emission in 
centralized and decentralized systems with incentives to reduce cost and no incentives to 
reduce emission.  The calculation shall yield the optimum ordering quantity which in turn 
yields the savings between the two systems. Finally core allocation principles will be 
leveraged to propose a fair allocation of savings. Furthermore, the model will be extended 
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to consider some regulation and different environments to which it will cater for carbon-
tax regulation and full Truckload system contexts.  
Findings indicate that applying inventory game theory leads to a reduction of 
carbon emissions along with cost. Additionally, the total carbon emissions in centralized 
system will always be less then decentralized system under all conditions. Moreover, the 
proposed proportional allocation which was proven to be a core allocation model will be 
based on the frequency of ordering and the amount of holding emissions. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The awareness of carbon emissions within supply chain increased among individuals 
and firms during   the past decades.  It was estimated that carbon dioxide emissions were 
around 40 billion tons in 2002,   and is expected to increase to 58 billion tons by 2030 
(Enkvist et al. 2007). Many entities all over the world embarked on initiatives in an 
attempt to save the environment by apply regulations and policies over business sectors 
or individuals. Organizations such as IPCC, Kyoto Protocol, and EU were established 
to control and manage the amount of carbon emissions.  
For firms under governments who signed with the international regulations are in a 
pressure to reduce their carbon emissions. Their operation management within the 
supply chain, does not depend on cost only, but carbon emissions became a factor of the 
decision. These firms are obligated to follow the regulations that are imposed by the 
government or international entities to reduce carbon emissions within the region. The 
regulations can be in a form of strict carbon caps, imposing carbon tax for every carbon 
emission emitted or exceeded the cap, opening the market for carbon trading and offset. 
Self-initiatives can be another reason for having firm considering carbon emissions 
within their operation. These firms are aware of the consequences of having carbon 
being emitted from their daily operation within the supply chain. Other firms starts to 
build an environmental friendly product in order to satisfy customers who are aware 
about the environment and to increase their market share. Toyota Company, for 
example, started to create a new hybrid cars in order to target these type of customers 
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Many researchers investigated different techniques and methods to reduce carbon 
emission within sup- ply chain context. Most of the researches addressed investing in a 
new technology, or adjusting a firm’s operation. Investment can be costly where firms 
has to pay a huge amount to change the currently used technology or building. Since 
investment can be costly, firms tended to find optimal solutions without having dramatic 
increase in cost. Solution included changes in operations such as changing the ordering 
quantity, production quantity, transportation selection mode, storage quantity, facilities 
location, etc. For example, if the amount of carbon emitted during the holding process 
is high due the refrigerator, the firm can change the amount of the holding units and 
store less quantities (Chen et al. 2013). This action can reduce carbon emission 
pertaining to the holding process. However, the total cost may increase because 
inventory management is a trade-off between holding and ordering costs. Reducing 
holding cost will probably lead to an increase to the ordering cost. 
Supply chain cooperation and supply chain coordination can be types of operational 
adjustments were firms can apply to reduce carbon emissions. Supply chain cooperation 
is coordination between different members within the supply chain. The retailer will 
adjust its ordering quantity based on the warehouse and or the supplier and opposite. 
Supply chain cooperation, also known as joint replenishment and shipment 
consolidation, is firms who are doing the same business will be sharing and joining their 
resources. Many researchers investigated the reduction of carbon emission under 
cooperation context. Joint replenishment is a common used method in supply chain 
where firms coordinate and consolidate their resources, shipment, and/or orders. 
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Individual firms join their resources to gain the advantages from risk pooling, 
Negotiation and reduction of cost. 
There are several researches addressing reducing carbon emission under supply 
chain and under consolidated system. However, research addressing the effect of 
consolidation on carbon emission where the motivation is to reduce cost only is scarce. 
Similarly, the research addressing the allocation of the saving of carbon emission 
resulting from the consolidation is also scarce. This thesis will address the effect of 
using game theory on carbon emission where multiple cases / scenarios will be 
considered as well as developing a function for saving allocation. 
 
1.1 Scope of the study 
 
The purpose of the thesis is to show the effect and behavior of carbon emission under 
centralized supply chain as well as to develop an effective model for allocating the 
savings of carbon emission among the parties within the coalition. The aim is to show 
that consolidation can lead to a reduction in carbon emission as well as a cost 
reeducation, and to propose a saving allocation model. 
The paper will adapt and alter the game theory model in (Meca et al. 2004 and the 
basic (EOQ) model in Chen et al. 2013)’s research to address the issue. The newly 
developed formulas will calculate carbon emission in both decentralized and centralized 
systems by adapting the optimum quantity that is calculated and used in reducing the 
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total cost. The rational of this approach is to show the behavior of carbon emission in 
both systems when firms are cooperating in order to reduce cost. Moreover, the thesis 
endeavor to prove that carbon emission can be reduced. 
The study will also contribute to addressing the allocation of the savings/cost within 
the parties in the game using the method of inventory game. Based on the formulated 
model, the core allocation of the game will be found and then a proportional allocation 
will be proposed based on the frequencies of order and holding emissions. 
An extended model of carbon emission under carbon-tax regulation will be also 
presented. Regulations on supply chain can influence cost and ordering quantity and 
consequently affect carbon emissions. Similar to the above, the carbon-tax regulation 
model carbon emission formula will be developed and then the core allocation model 
will be developed. The final extended model (Full Truckload system) will be also 
presented to show the effect on carbon emission considering that the ordering size is 
fixed by the truck size. 
 
1.2 Methodology 
 
The methodology of thesis followed the basics of formulated EOQ models under 
different systems to calculate carbon emission base on the literature surveys.  An altered 
model of EOQ model was formulated   to calculate carbon emission under centralized 
and decentralized. Both models will be using the optimum order quantity obtained from 
the optimum total cost models. To formulate the model and build it, simple mathematics 
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and the “mathmatica” program were used. First, a model to calculate the total carbon 
emission under the desired systems with the assist of simple mathematics was formed. 
Second, the gap of both systems and the saving function were obtained. Third, the 
saving function, the principle of core allocation, and mathematics were used to find the 
core allocation of the system. ”Mathimatica” program was used to provide the required 
graphs. The numerical data were formed in a random in order to prove the results. 
 
1.3 Significance of the Model to Qatar 
 
Participating in reducing the global climate changes is one of Qatar’s 2030 strategic 
vision goals. As indicated in Qatar National development strategy 2011-2016 [for 
Development Planning], one of the main stagey goals was to reduce carbon emission 
and have a green environment. The strategy indicates that Qatar produces more than 
7,000 tons of waste daily, and their aim is to reduce this number by 2016. In order to 
contribute to global warming, Qatar is targeting the adaptation of policies and 
technologies used by other countries as well as forcing government and private sector 
to become environmentally friendly. 
This study can only be used by companies in Qatar once proper regulation and 
policies are formed. Nonetheless, the study can serve some sectors within the country 
by providing an insight about the facts of carbon emissions within the decentralized or 
centralized system. To that end, firms or decision-makers can have a reference to form 
the regulation, policies, and adapt best practices. 
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1.4 Paper Organization 
The study is divided to into eight chapters including the current introductory chapter. 
The remaining chapters will organized as the following: 
Chapter 2: Literature review section begins by revising literature pertaining to the 
background of carbon emission and sustainable operation with examples of some 
application, next the literature includes joint replenishment main models, usage, and how 
to use with carbon emission. Finally, the literature touches upon basic introductory of 
inventory game theory, designs, and outcomes. 
Chapter3: Describes the problem as well as limitations and assumptions. 
Chapter 4: Explains model formulation. It begins by providing the basic model of 
EOQ in decentralized and centralized system. Second, altering the basic EOQ formula 
to cater for carbon emission. Finally, providing the ability to measure the gap between 
centralized and decentralized system. 
Chapter 5: pertains to carbon emission allocation based on the findings of chapter4. 
The core allocation will be presented and numerical example will be giving. 
Chapter6 and 7: Covers the extended models. The first extended model will be an 
extension of the carbon-tax incentive model. The second extended model will address 
full truckload model. Finally, the model formulation, findings, allocation and numerical 
example will be provided for both extended models. 
Chapter 8: Highlights main findings, conclusions, and future work. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
This chapter presents a wide range summary and comprehensive review of carbon 
emission in supply chain management, joint replenishment and inventory Game theory. 
The chapter is divided into three sections, Section (2.1) is an overview of carbon 
emissions, regulations and sustainable operations. First, it present a brief background 
about carbon emission in supply chain and Highlights the incentive of firms and 
organization to move towards sustainable operations and some applications. 
Section (2.2) is about Joint replenishments. The section stars with joint 
replenishments definitions and benefits, then it moves to applications and method used, 
and models. Next, it addresses applying these methods on carbon emission, and shows 
all the insights with regards to applying this method. 
Section (2.3) addresses game theory model in general by giving a brief about core 
allocation then shows some applications. 
 
2.1 Carbon Emissions and Sustainable Operations 
 
Between year 1970 and 2004, the GHG emission had increase by 70% (Rice et 
al.2007). This increase was due to human activities that is associated to GHG gases such 
as carbon dioxide or (carbon), ”CH4, and nitrous oxide (N2O), perfluorocarbons PFCs, 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) and ozone-depleting 
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substances” (Metz et al. 2007). (Edenhofer et al. 2014) reported that there was an 
increase of 10 GtCO2eq of GHG between year 2000 and 2010. The increase was directly 
related to the following human activates: Energy Supply by 47%, industries by 30%, 
transportation by 11% and building sectors by 3% . If no additional regulations and 
policies were to be set, the increase in carbon emission can reach 25-90% by year 2030 
compared to year 2000 (Rice et al.2007). 
There are several international commitments to reduce carbon emissions. Kyoto 
protocol, that is linked to United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
is one of the international agreements in which it binds its parties to reduce emissions 
[Nations]. Kyoto protocol managed to reduce GHG emission by 12.5% in 1990. It was 
agreed that in 2010, the emission is to be reduced by 19% under Blair administration’s 
control, and to reach 60% of reduction by 2050 (Martin et al. 2014). As china was one 
of the parties in Kyoto protocol, the government had announced in 2009 that it will 
reduce carbon emissions by 40-45% by 2020(Lin et al. 2010). European Union (EU), 
that manages the activates of carbon emission for almost 50% of European countries, 
had set up a new regulation to reduce carbon emission (Hoen et al. 2014). EU committed 
to reduce carbon emission by 20% by 2020 comparing to 1990’s level. In 2013, EU 
managed to reach a total reduction of 19% which keeps them within their target for 
2020[European commission]. 
Greenhouse gases are natural gases that appears in the atmosphere such as carbon 
dioxide, methane, and some others that are made by industries during supply chain 
process [NCDC]. As Carbon Dioxide (CO2) is found to be occupying half of the amount 
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of gases that had been emitted and had an effect on the environment, most papers or 
organizations address greenhouse gases as carbon emission (Floros and Vlachou et al. 
2005). The process of calculating the set of greenhouse gases that had been emitted by 
a firm or by supply chain is defined as carbon Footprinting. Many organizations use 
Carbon Footprinting to determine the amount of greenhouse gasses that had been 
emitted throughout the supply chain processes. It can assist in determining the exact 
process to which the organization has to focus on to reduce carbon emissions from it 
supply chain (Caro et al. 2013). Reduction of carbon emission can be done by lowering 
the carbon Footprinting within the direct emissions, indirect emission or both 1  . 
(Matthews et al. 2008) mentioned that 14% of total carbon emission within the Supply 
chain comes from direct emissions, while 26% comes from both direct and indirect 
emissions. Along with emission reduction, some organizations think about minimizing 
the cost associated with this emission reduction. 
Kumar et al.2007 research called for imposing restrictions on carbon emission. The 
research explained the tradeoff between transportation, storage and carbon emission. 
However, Kumar did not address the cost of this reduction. In current days, reducing 
                                                          
1 1GHG protocol had defined the “direct emissions” as the emissions that are controlled and managed by the 
firm at its premises. ”Indirect emissions” are the ones that are associated with the firm’s productions and 
activities but they are accruing at another area that the firm cannot control. 1Emissions are split into 3 scopes. 
Scop1 is the direct emission, Scope 2 is the indirect emissions from consumers that are associated with 
electricity usage and Scope 3 is all type of indirect emissions. Supply chain follows in Scope 3 [5], [55] , [44] 
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carbon emission is always associated with cost. Organizations try to find the best 
method to reduce emission with the least cost possible. Investment in supply chin 
process can be one of the methods. It is a long term strategy for organizations to reduce 
emission and at the same time be profitable. The widely used type of investment can be 
changing a currently used technology to a one that is more environmental friendly and 
reduces emission (Palmer and Burtraw et al.2005).  Most   of the investments are being 
used to reduce both direct and indirect emissions. (Dietz et al. 2009) stated that 
investment can reduce up to 7.4% of US national emission. Investments were 
categorized into 5 types: type 1, onetime investments for a building or manufacture to 
reduce carbon emission; type2, investing in new technology. This can be replaced at the 
end of the useful time; type 3: investment in maintenance; type4: equipment adjustment; 
type 5: daily operations such as more efficient driving and eliminating standby 
electricity. 
A different type of investments can be a development of a new innovation that targets 
customers who are concerned about the environments. (Kleindorfer et al. 2005) stated 
that some companies do invest in new sustainable technologies to surpass their 
competitors. A case study addressed the invention of Toyota’s hybrid cars. The car is 
designed to consume half the gasoline and emit half the CO2. This innovation was new 
to the market and was not proposed by automobile companies that focus on sustainable 
technologies to which it gave Toyota an advantage. Even though (Kleindorfer et al. 
2005) mentioned that investing in sustainable technology can be uncertain with regards 
to the benefits and development efforts, (Plambeck et al.2012) supported(Kleindorfer et 
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al. 2005) and stated that Walmart was able to increase its revenue just by reducing 
emission and charging higher for ”green” products. That is because reducing emission 
can improve the public image to which there are some customers who are willing to pay 
extra for ”green” products. (Nouira et al. 2013) supported this point by proving that the 
demand changes depending on the level of ”greenness” of the product, and this 
greenness comes from the type of transportation mode selected. These changes can lead 
to an increase in the product cost. Nevertheless, the greener the product is, the higher 
the demand will be for those customers who care about the environment. A company 
can have a market share advantage even without reducing the emission of a product. 
Based on (Kalkanci et al. 2013)’s results, a company can increase its market share by 
revealing the environmental impact of its products to the public, even if the impact was 
high. Revealing this information can give a positive image to the company that cares 
about the environment and thus will increase its market share. 
Sustainable operation is a wide field addressed by many researchers and literatures. 
The aim of the paper is to show the effect on carbon emission under supply chain daily 
operation and regulations. In order to save the environment and reduce the amount of 
pollutions and emissions in a whole region or a country, regulations and policies were 
made by governments and unions to control carbon emissions. Many policies were 
stablished such as political science. Political science was formed on 1970s, but its 
engagement to supply chain was not active until mid1990s (Corbett and Klassen et 
al.2006).  That is because at that time, the focus was shifted to the whole supply chain 
and all its steps rather than a single operation or organization. It was found that the value 
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will be greater if all steps within the chain were to be optimized than just focusing on a 
single process (Linton et al. 2007).Type of policies associated with carbon emissions 
within supply chain are: carbon-cap, carbon-tax, cap-and-offset, cap-and-trade and 
many others, where each of which can have a different impact on the total emission 
reduction and total supply chain cost. These policies can be used individually or to be 
combined together. 
Carbon-cap policy (carbon capacity) is to set up an upper bound to the amount of 
carbon emission to be emitted within industries or commercials. Under strict carbon 
caps, the total carbon emission emitted from industries or commercials’ operations 
should not exceed the cap. The characteristic of the policy are as the following: first, the 
carbon cap can be applied into a period, or for the whole supply chain (Bai and Mu et 
al.2014). Second, In case it was imposed on the whole horizon, the emission can be 
carried from a period to another. Third, the carbon can be emitted from production, 
ordering process, transportation and inventory holding (Benjaafar et al. 2013).(Song and 
Leng et al.2012) in his paper made an analysis that in a single period, the policy-maker 
should set the capacity lower than the company’s optimal quantity. That is because in 
case the optimal quantity was lower than the mandatory capacity quantity, then there 
won’t be any befit to the environment and government to impose this policy. This 
analysis was a support to (Benjaafar et al. 2013)’s insights with regards of setting the 
carbon cap in single or multi-firms. 
Second type of regulation is Carbon tax. Carbon tax is the tax associated with a unit 
of carbon emission. Tax can have a variety of forms, but the simplest is to have a cost 
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related to the number of carbon units that had been emitted (Benjaafar et al. 2013). Many 
European countries started to implement carbon tax on industries and commercials in 
1990s. The rate varies from a country to another and it also depends on the sector it is 
applied on (Almutairi et al.2013). Many researchers addressed the effect of carbon taxes 
on operational decisions. (Floros and Vlachou et al.2005) stated that the implication of 
carbon tax reduces carbon emission in Greek manufactures and that it can be used to 
mitigate carbon emission. Flores and Vlanchou also stated that despite carbon emission 
reduction, applying this regulation will increase the total cost of the firms. Since the 
firm will have to pay extra cost associated to emission. 
Cap-and-offset policy is allowing firms to exceed the allocated cap associated, but 
to be financially penalized for doing so by imposing a cost to every unit of carbon that 
was emitted above their limit. Cap- and-Trade policy is opening the market to firms to 
buy or sell carbon emissions. For firms that emit less carbon emission than their defined 
cap, they can sell the extra amount to the public and can buy if it was the other way 
around. Carbon policies became a main factor in the currently addressed problems and 
more examples will be stated throughout this literature review. 
Investing to reduce carbon emissions or changing in operational decisions can 
sometimes be costly especially in inventory management operation. There are many 
researches that addressed the effect of applying environmental policies on supply chain 
while considering the total cost and carbon emission. Many others provided a model 
that can assist single firms to select the best optimal ordering quantity that reduces the 
total cost and minimizes total carbon emissions. (Benjaafar et al. 2013) used a lot-sizing 
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model to present some insights with regards to carbon caps, furthermore, in a single 
firm with a strict carbon cap, three observations were made. Observation 1: just by 
changing in operational decision and adjusting the ordering quantity, the emission can 
be reduced down to 15% while the total average cost will increase by 3%. This reduction 
in emission depends on the ratio of the ordering to holding cost and the ration of the 
ordering to holding emission in which it ”continue(s) to play a dominate role in whether 
or not operational adjustments could have a significant impact on emission.” 
Observation 2: by adjusting the operational decision only, it could be more cost effective 
than investing in energy efficient technology. As it is known, investing in environmental 
friendly technology can reduce the emission, on the other hand, it can cost the company 
more. Adjusting the operational decision can reduce emission with a slight increase in 
cost. One of the main insight were that by tightening the Caps, this may result in 
increasing the carbon emission rather than reducing it. Due to forcing a carbon cap on 
period base, the reduction of carbon emission will happen in one period, but then it’ll 
be increased in the coming periods. An example, if a firm orders a huge quantity to 
reduce the emission from ordering, this can lead to an increase in the holding cost of 
these inventories in the period following the ordering period. 
(Chen et al. 2013) used the insights made in the Benjaafar’s paper and showed that, 
in a single firm within Supply chain, the emission can be reduced significantly without 
increasing cost by only adjusting the operational decisions. Furthermore, it developed 
economic order quantity (EOQ model) to calculate the total carbon emission emitted 
from the operation whether it was in ordering or holding cost. While imposing a strict 
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cap policy only, the results showed that it is possible to reduce emissions by modifying 
the order quantity. Since the cost function is flat at the optimal quantity (Q), another Q 
at the flat range can be chosen. By only changing Q, the emission can be changed 
significantly while having a lower relative increase in cost. Additionally, it showed that 
reducing emission by adjusting order quantity is possible if and only if the ration of the 
ordering to holding cost does not equal the ration of the ordering to holding emission. 
The model was extended to show the variant in changes between the optimal Q and the 
newly calculated Q. the variance model was used to calculate the delta change in both 
the cost and emission function while using both Qs based on the difference between 
both rations. 
Another approach was made by (Tracht et al. 2013) were it explained how changing 
order quantity can reduce carbon emission within supply chain management. The author 
made an enhancement to EOQ model to calculate the total cost for ordering, holding, 
Backordering and shortage cost along with the emission cost associated with 
transportation. Emissions are counted based on the destination and fuel consumed 
during an order. From this model, it was shown that emissions can be reduced by 
increasing the order quantity in which it will cause the firm to order less frequently. This 
reduction in ordering frequency leads to a reduction in transportation. The author also 
showed how the optimum cost from the model including carbon emission is higher than 
the one without, and the ordering quantity increases as well. 
More elaborations were done with regards to other carbon emissions policies. Hua 
et al. 2011 studied the impact of carbon cap and carbon price under cap- and-Trade 
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mechanism at the ordering quantity, total cost and total emission in inventory 
management model(EOQ) . By combining both cost and carbon emission in one model, 
the numerical results showed that ordering quantity will change between the optimal 
Ordering Quantity in EOQ model and Optimal ordering quantity that will minimize the 
carbon emission. Under Cap-and-Trade, based on the carbon price per a unit of carbon 
and carbon-cap, the total cost varies. With a reasonable price, if the total carbon 
emission was higher than the Cap, then the firm will buy carbon credits, and will sell if 
the total carbon emission was less. When the total emissions equal the carbon cap, the 
company should neither sell nor buy. Furthermore, the author showed that if the carbon 
price was high, then it may be a chance for firms to decrease their total cost by selling 
carbon credits. The total cost will decrease if the carbon cap was high and the total 
carbon emission is below the cap, firms will be able to reduce carbon emissions and sell 
more carbon credit, and vice versa if the cap was low. 
(Benjaafar et al. 2013)’s paper covered carbon and trade as well. The carbon 
emissions are affected by the price of a unit of carbon instead of the carbon cap’s limit. 
The results showed that the carbon emissions are not affected by the change in carbon 
caps, but by the change in the price of the trade. Similarly, the higher the carbon price 
is, the lower the total cost can be. That is because when the cost increases, firms are 
encouraged to adjust their operational decisions to reduce the carbon emissions and sell 
these saved carbons to increase their profit. Additionally, the paper also covered carbon 
off-set where an insight about carbon offset with a tight emission caps was shared and 
explained that firms tend to offset even when the price of a unit of carbon is high. 
17 
 
Carbon tax was addressed in (Chen et al. 2013)’s paper, where the EOQ model was 
extended to include carbon prices. It considered having a carbon-tax and cap-and-price. 
The paper showed that a new Q function under carbon-tax can be generated to find the 
optimal Q that will minimize the total cost while reducing carbon emissions. The results 
presented that assigning a tax can reduce the emission cost. The reduction can satisfy 
the slight increase in the total cost as the order quantity moves away from the optimum 
value. Carbon-tax will not necessarily decrease carbon emission level. UNDER et 
al.2013 showed the effect of carbon-tax on both retailer and supplier. It showed that 
under this regulation, the supplier’s annual carbon emission and cost can be reduced, 
while the retailer can reduce his annual carbon emission, but not the annual cost. (Krass 
et al. 2013) in his paper showed that if the tax rate was set high, then this can have a 
negative impact to the system. (Martin et al. 2014) on the other hand, demonstrated the 
impact of carbon tax on manufactures by having a comparison of firms that pays a fully 
tax amount and firms that pays a discounted tax amount. It showed that imposing a 
moderate carbon taxes can help in reducing energy intensity and thus reduce carbon 
emissions. 
(Repetto et al.2013) in his paper ”Cap-and-Trade contains global warming better 
than Carbon tax” stated that carbon-and-trade policy is better to be used in order to 
reduce carbon emission even though the revenue is fluctuated. Carbon tax is being set 
and regulated by the government in which the price of carbon tax is imposed to the 
service that emits emissions such as Fuel. This can have an effect on the product price 
if the firm used a service that is associated with carbon emission. Carbon-and-Trade, on 
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the other hand, permits the energy user to set the price based on the market. Another 
point that was raised in the paper is that the services associated to the regulated carbon 
tax will be affected by the unit price; while in carbon-and-trade the services won’t be 
affected as the amount of carbon emission will be reduced. 
Many researches addressed transportation selection mode and facility location such 
as (Gucwa and Schafer et al.2013 and Hoen et al. 2013). ”The transport sector is the 
second largest carbon emissions contributor in Europe and its emissions continue to 
increase” (Hoen et al. 2013) . In 2006, the carbon emission from transportation was 
around 23%, and it is expected to reach 60% in 2030. Hoen et al. 2014 in his latest paper 
studied the transportation methods and ranked them based on the amount of carbon 
emission. The author used Order-up-to policy and single-period newsboy problem and 
extended the model to be able to calculate the emissions from the activities. The paper 
showed that the emissions for air transportation are the highest, then road, rail and 
finally water transport to be the lowest. Cost was not mentioned in the previous study, 
(Lu et al. 2008)’s paper showed that changing the transportation mode can lead to a 
reduction in carbon emission and sometimes the total cost based on the transportation 
mode selected and the price of the carbon emission.  (Nouira et al. 2013) elaborated 
more by providing the best transportation mode along with the new facility location. 
More elaboration were done by (Lu et al. 2008) where it was pointed out that changing 
the transportation mode in order to reduce carbon emission can have an impact on 
customer satisfaction level and vice versa. Another idea was proposed by (Cachon et 
al.2011) where enhancing the supply chain design and transportation model by adding 
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retailers and customers to the model and check if carbon emission and total cost will be 
affected if the costumer was fully charged for the emission cost. 
 
2.2 Carbon emission under joint replenishment 
 
Unlike previous research where inventory management focuses on reducing total 
cost and emission from a single firm system, this part of the literature will have a brief 
about how firms can join resources in order to reduce average cost and carbon emission 
under such a system. Since the proposed model includes consolidation of two models, 
a couple of papers with carbon emission and carbon emission regulation under joint 
replenishment system will be revised. 
Before moving to carbon emission under joint replenishment system, a brief about 
joint replenishment will be presented.  Joint replenishment is a term used in supply chain 
to define the process of having a   set of organization/firms, at a different or same level 
on supply chain, joining their inventory orders into one, or a firm joining multi items in 
one order instead of ordering it separately. It is also called shipment consolidation or 
inventory pooling. The main reason of consolidation is reducing total cost for the whole 
supply chain and individuals. It can also benefit firms in reducing any uncertainty and 
help in managing demands when demand is stochastic (Elomri et al. 2013). Goyal in 
1977 was the first to present the idea of having a coordination between a vendor and a 
buyer. This concept was the basic of the current models now days Guiffrida et al. 2011. 
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Joint replenishment is useful when there is a single-retailer and multiple items, or 
single item and multiple retailers. A single retailer and multiple items, represents a 
scenario where a firm is sending out multiple items to a retailer, or when multiple items 
has to be sent to a retail in one order/ transportation. For single item and multiple 
retailers, a scenario of a firm sending a single item to multiple locations (Silva and Gao 
et al.2013). It can also help in reducing supplier based. In 1980s, many firms reduced 
their supplier based.  Texas Instruments, for example, reduced it is supplier based by 
85% in 2 years.     They went from 5000 supplier down to 750 between 1998 and 2000 
(Mustafa Tanrikulu et al. 2010). 
A single item and multiple locations (retailers) scenario was addressed by many 
researches. (Cetinkaya and Lee et al.2000) for example, created a model to computed 
the optimum replenishment quantity for coordinated inventory shipment to multi 
retailers in VMI system. For a Stochastic demand system with multiple retailers and one 
item, the author thought of consolidate the shipment of these retailers into one by having 
a fixed cycle instead for a cycle per retailer. This means that there is a probability of 
having a backorder to which the author presented it with a waiting penalty. (Cheung and 
Lee et al.2002) introduced the same concept and included stock rebalancing concept. 
The author found that even though the cost decreased under coordination, however 
when the number of retailers increases, the benefit will decrease, the higher the number 
of retailers, the flatter the graph becomes. This applies to the system with or without 
stock rebalancing. 
 (Silva and Gao et al. 2013) solved the same problem under EOQ model. The author 
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considered replenishing inventory level at retails’ under a joint shipment in order to 
reduce the cost of transportation. The author extended the model to include location 
decisions as well to decide to which retailers the shipments should be consolidated. 
Moving to single-retailer and multi-items, many researches addressed reduction of 
cost through consolidation. (Goyal et al. 1974) w the first to represent the replenishment 
of multiple items where each item has a strict order frequency. The Author presented an 
algorithm to find the optimum annual cost by proving the minimum and maximum 
bounds. (Khouja* et al. et al. 2005) made an enhancement to Goyal’s algorithm by 
considering continues unit cost change while Goyal’s algorithm was made with an 
assumption that the unit cost is fixed and does not change. Khouja also considered the 
model to be made under Indirect Grouping Strategy environment. Just like Goyal, 
Khouja found the lower and upper bound and the optimum annual cost. Khouja also 
found that when the unit cost declines, the life cycle gets shorter; while when it 
increases, the cycle gets expanded. 
According to kouja’s in 2012, Wang proposed a method to find the optimum cost 
under direct grouping. Direct grouping is different from Indirect grouping by having the 
items grouped to m groups. Each item within each group will have the same cycle time. 
While in indirect grouping, each items will have a different cycle time. The author 
solved the model using differential evaluation (DE) and evolutionary algorithm (EA) 
and found that total cost can be lower for direct grouping under DE method. 
More elaborative and complicated system was developed by (Hajji et al. 2009). The 
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author considered finding the optimum annual cost for an uncertainty and an interaction 
environment on a stochastic supply chain with three stages. The author also considered 
combining production and ordering costs as one model and equation instead of finding 
the total cost of each separately. The policy that was developed will help suppliers to 
plan their inventory level under the uncertainty of not having raw materials on the 
desired time, or a massive backorder due to unavailability on previous period; and at the 
same time to meet the retailer’s demand. The author obtained a control policy with a 
combined multi-level base stock policy and state-depend economic order quantity. 
(Mustafa Tanrikulu et al. 2010) proposed a new model for multi-items and single 
supplier. The authors’ model was built for a stochastic demand model with multi-items 
and fixed truck size. Each shipment should not exceed the truck size and backorders 
were considered. The author created a (s,Q) model where it can be used when backorder 
cost or service level is high, shipment capacity, and when the lead time is short. The 
author also proposed that the model can be used with multi supplier and single item. 
A more complicated model was presented by (Chen et al.2000). The author proposed 
a model to find the optimum replenishment quantity in a joint N stages with N items. 
The model was made in a stochastic demand environment with a passion demand in 
each stage. The model is to handle a several assembly points with multi units and with 
multi retailers with various demands. Chen’s model was created with a fixed batch size, 
where various batch sizes were handled later on by (Benjaafar et al. 2006). Benjaafar 
introduced the same model under stochastic demand with a various batch sizes. The 
model can help decision makers to decide the number of items to be produced and 
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demands to be satisfied. 
All of the above introduced papers were about joint replenishment within the same 
organization in order to reduce the cost within the firm or to enhance the operation. 
Next, researches addressing joint replenishment problems among two or three firms 
were all these firms will join their resources to reduce cost. (Meca et al. 2004) focused 
on having the initiatives from retailers to place an order, while usually from previous 
papers, the initiatives comes from the supplier as he knows the demand. The paper 
extended the inventory management system model by adding multi firms managing a 
single inventory in the system with a deterministic demand. The model assumes a single 
supplier where all firms are going to have a joint order from. A reduction in the total 
cost is possible since all firms will corporate and place one big order. Since orders are 
joint, the frequency of ordering and the cycle length will be equal for all. The firm with 
the long cycle will reduce its ordering size and order more frequently than ordering big 
quantities under the same interval. Reducing ordering size will reduce the inventory in 
hand and thus reducing the holding total cost of these inventories as well. The paper 
provided the optimal total cost and the ordering quantity for all firms. Some firms avoid 
joining due to prevent sharing of private information. However, the paper proposed that 
it is enough for each firm to reveal their ordering frequency only where their demand 
and holding cost will remain enclosed. The intermediate will sum all requests and place 
one big order where it is going to be the only information passed to the supplier. The 
supplier will only know the total quantity required and will not know the quantity 
required for each firm. 
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A condition was introduced by (Nagarajan et al. 2010)’s model. The author proposed 
how firms can join in order to take an advantage of quantity discount offered by a 
supplier. Assuming n firms buying from a single supplier where this supplier offers a 
discount per number of units to be purchased. A firm will try to join his order with other 
firms in order to get advantage of it if he was not able to by ordering individually. The 
model was created under deterministic demand system. The paper calculates the saving 
of the joint under discrete discount schedule and continuous discount schedule. 
(Elomri et al. 2013) addressed n retailers joining their replenishment under full 
truckload system. Each order should not exceed a certain size which is the truck 
capacity. The model was an enhancement of the topical EOQ model to accommodate n 
firms and fixed batch size. The paper showed that the ordering cost won’t be affected 
by the number of n firms joining together as the batch size is fixed, but the holding cost 
will be affected and this is where firms can save cost from. 
The concept of joint replenishment can be used to reduce carbon emission as well. 
Many firms attempt to reduce carbon emissions within their firm solely without paying 
attention to reduce carbon emission from supply chain as a whole. The absence of 
collaboration and coordination can result in an increase to the overall carbon emission 
in supply chain (Benjaafar et al. 2013). One of the advantages of having carbon 
constraints is allowing firms to coordinate in order to maintain carbon level. 
Coordination among firms within supply chain can have a great impact in reducing the 
cost in some cases. With strict cap emissions, firms tends to coordinate to reduce carbon 
emission along with the total cost. 
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Guiffrida (2011) developed an analytical development model that measures the 
performance of supply chain under carbon emission. The model considered two-level 
supply chain where the total cost is coordinated among parties with regards to lot-size 
shipment. The demand from the retail was used as the base of the quantity that has to 
be produced and shipped. The paper considered the contribution to environment as a 
quality cost function that is added to the total cost of supply chain. This cost function 
covered the transportation cost from fuel and any other emissions among the cycle.  This 
model was used to help decision maker to select reasonable quality cost values. That is 
because having a high quality cost can cause a reduction to profit. However, this model 
did not consider any carbon regulation to reduce down carbon emission. 
(Benjaafar et al. 2013) presented an extension to his model from the previous section 
to address the problem associated with coordination under carbon regulations. The 
paper showed that the cost under coordination after imposing a strict carbon cap 
regulation leaded to significant reduction in cost “with the benefit highest when the 
carbon cap is in the mid-range rather than either very low or very high.” When the cap 
is very high, the policy won’t have an effect on the total carbon emission reduction. 
When the cap is low, the firms will have no room for adjustments which may lead to 
less or no reduction in cost. However, a reduction can happen due to the coordination 
among the n firms. This means that the benefit from operation adjustment due to carbon 
emission is more effective if there is a strict carbon caps. 
More regulations were presented by (Zeng et al. 2012). (Zeng et al. 2012) presented 
2-eclone system under lot-sizing model.  The paper showed that under fixed carbon tax 
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rate, depending on the value of the carbon tax rate, cost and emissions can be affected. 
With a high carbon tax rate, the emission will start to decrease rapidly and the cost to 
increase. If the carbon tax rate was set to be too high, the carbon emission will start to 
decrease gently while the cost will increase linearly. Another approach was to have the 
regulators defining a low level of carbon (E1) and a high level of carbon (E2). Under 
progressive carbon tax rate, a normal rate is set to E1, when the carbon emissions are 
under or equal to E1 level; and a higher rate is set to E2, when the firm’s carbon exceeds 
E2 level. The result showed that, the cost will be affected only when E1’s level is low, 
and the emission will be affected only when E2’s level is high. (Jaber et al. 2013) also 
developed a model based on a 2-echlon Supply chain and studied the effect of carbon 
tax. It showed that in 2-echlon Supply Chain, by applying taxes only, the total cost of 
the whole supply chain will not be reduced when having the optimal emission rate. 
Having the optimal emission rate will have an unnecessarily increase in total cost. When 
applying penalty policy only, the author provided a formula to calculate the optimal 
production quantity. The optimal quantity will be the quantity that will reduce carbon 
emission. This quantity can either be the optimal without a regulation if the cap was 
high, or the lowest production rate that will keep the emission not exceeded. 
Another study was presented by (Bai and Mu et al.2014) in which it used the same 
concept but in a different system. The paper is about the impact of carbon emissions 
policies on supply chain based on the theory of System dynamic. The model is under 
two-echelon supply chain (supplier and retail) in which the demand from the retailer 
defines the whole productivity at the supplier. The paper showed that, under Cap policy, 
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when placing caps to firms individually, if the caps were reasonable, it’ll lead to a 
reduction in emission and cost. In case the caps were placed at the supply chain as a 
whole, this will lead to a total reduction in supply chain emissions and cost with a higher 
profit than having the caps being imposed on firms individually. Results showed that 
“coordination of supply chain is one of the most effective ways to make full use of 
carbon caps policies, and maximize the supply chain profit.” By implying another 
policy, the paper showed that under cap-and-trade, reduction of carbon emission and 
cost depends on the price of a unit of carbon and the carbon cap as well. 
Another applications can be found in (Chaabane et al.2013) works. The research 
developed a model to help decision maker and policy makers to sustain their supply 
chain.  The linear programming model   is designed to calculate the optimal carbon-
Trade price for the company. It can also be used to find the reasonable carbon-cap that 
will help in reducing emission without increasing the cost. The paper showed that when 
fixing the carbon price for each period and varying the carbon cap, the total cost 
increases linearly while the carbon cap decreases. On the other hand, when the carbon 
price starts to vary in each period, the total cost increases but not linearly. (Caro et al. 
2013) made another contribution by applying the idea to LCA model. The paper used 
life-cycle assessment and carbon footprint to determine the total emission from a joint 
production supply chain. The author first determined the footprint from each process 
within the supply chain with multiple firms, then determined if double counting can be 
avoided or not. The results showed that, if each firm wants to have their best practice, 
double-counting cannot be avoided. Firms that cares to reduce the total carbon emission 
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from supply chain, can provide some mechanism to share the cost and the profit of the 
emission reduction with the firm with the most carbon emission emitted. 
Last point presented by Caro supports (Benjaafar et al. 2013) with regards to 
reducing the cost per firm individually when they are under coordination. Coordination 
can indeed lead to a reduction in the total overall supply chain cost, but it may not lead 
to a reduction in the cost and carbons for some firms within the supply chain. Benjaafar 
stated that Firm 1 can make an adjustment in the ordering or holding quantity in order 
to coordinate and reduce the emission for Firm 2. This adjustment can lead to an increase 
in the total cost and emission of Firm1 even though the overall cost is reduced and 
carbon emissions are within the cap. Coordination can also lead to an investment in 
physical infrastructure. The investment is done by the firms with the least carbon 
emission to assist the ones with high carbon emission. For example, if Firm1 has an 
efficient holding emissions while Firm2 does not, Firm1 can invest in holding 
techniques and share the inventory holding with Firm2 to reduce the total emission of 
supply chain. Firms will have to compensate in order to reduce the overall carbon 
emission. But the question that was raised is how to divide the surplus from the 
coordination based on each companies’ compensations. 
 
2.3 Game Theory 
 
With the deployment of coordination and joint replenishment among several parties 
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with the motivation to reduce cost, the main question is how to allocate cost/ pay-offs 
among parties. The analysis of cost/ pay-offs allocation among parties in difference 
inventory management operations is referred to as Game theory. 
The analysis of the game theory should assure that the game is stable. Stability means 
finding all the feasible outcomes to which players will see a benefit from joining 
resources. In order to make the player to have an incentive to remain in the game, 
fairness and core allocation is required. The core allocation refers to having one of the 
feasible outcomes that will prevent a player or a coalition (group of players) to leave the 
grand coalition and form its/their own (Nagarajan and Sosˇic´ et al. 2008). 
Fairness can be hard to maintain specially with a complicated model and number of 
participants. To find the core allocation, first, the n players are grouped into S group 
(coalition), where S ⊂ N and N is the grand coalition.     With n players, the number of 
coalitions that can be formed is (2n − 1).To find the core allocation and to have the best 
benefit to all players, the following properties should be fulfilled while allocating: 
1. All saving to be divided. 
2. Each party to be assigned at least as much profit he could obtain when 
working individually. 
3. The profit is allocated so that no sub groups to have a better saving than 
grouping all together. 
Having the above characteristics can guarantee the fairness in allocation cost/ pay-
offs among the players (Nagarajan and Sosˇic´ 2008, Gilles et al. 2010). 
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Cost allocation is an old topic where it started in 1950s by Nash. Through the years, 
many researches where developed on how to allocate the savings among players based 
on the model proposed and information given by these parties and the incentive of 
cooperating. First, this part will introduce models that are closer to this research paper. 
In the past few years, many papers were written about a cooperative game theory with 
the basic inventory model under deterministic demand (EOQ). (Meca et al. 2004) 
”Inventory Game” paper, which is one of the popular papers,    introduced a shipment 
consolidation model between n parties and showed that the consolidation can lead to a 
cost saving. The author first showed that players can cooperate without revealing the 
basic information such as demand, holding cost, and can place an order using the 
frequency ordering. The author then proposed a way to allocated these saving by 
showing that proportional allocation of ordering frequencies can be the core allocation. 
The author then extended his model in his paper “cooperation and competitive in 
inventory game” by showing the core allocation under economic production quantity 
(EPQ) and a non-cooperative point of view. Then the author studied the nashi 
equilibrium of this model. 
A simple model with a fixed ordering size was presented by (Elomri et al. 2013) 
where it was shown an enhancement of EOQ model under a full truckload system. The 
author showed that the core allocation for the grand coalition and compared it with 
sharply value allocation. The author presented the limitation of sharply value allocation 
compared to the core allocation. This thesis was used to express an extension model in 
this thesis.  
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(Dror and Hartmanet al.2007 and Anily and Haviv et al.2007) presented the same 
model, where an extension of (Meca et al. 2004) was made to cover the major set up 
cost as well. The model proposed an equation with a holding cost to every item, minor 
ordering cost to every item, and a fixed major cost for every order. The major fixed cost 
will be charged at the player on the grand coalition even if he was not part of the players 
who placed the order in this period. Both papers showed that the function is a core 
allocation with a non-empty set. Anily and Haviv’s model focused on power-of-two 
policy where it also showed that the saving had a non-empty core system. (Zhang et 
al.2009) model was closely related to Anily and Haviv’s. The author proposed the same 
model under power-to-policy while allowing items to be stored on a warehouse. The 
warehouse is responsible for part of the major ordering cost as well. The author used 
langrangian dual theorem to prove that the saving is non-empty core. 
(Van den Heuvel et al. 2007) presented a similar model to meca’s where the model 
involved production cost along to the basic lot sizing model. The model had n retailers 
and a supplier with a cost function calculating the ordering, production and holding cost. 
NP production will be done unless the holding quantity was 0. The paper proved that 
cooperation can lead to saving in production cost along with the ordering cost. The paper 
also proved that the function is concave and a non-empty core. 
Production cost was introduced in (Guardiola et al. 2007)’s paper as well. The author 
introduced the basic idea of profit allocation under cooperative distribution chain with 
decreasing production cost depending of order quantity. The author proposed a model 
with a single supplier, intermediate and non-competitive multiple retailers who receives 
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a single item. The product cost is a decreasing function depends on the quantity of order. 
The game is an incentive to retailers to join their orders into a big one since the retailer 
does not know about the each retailer’s real order quantity due to having an 
intermediate. The author showed that by having the retailers joining their orders, the 
total cost decreases and the saving function is a non-empty core allocation. The author 
then showed that supplier can be a player in the game as well, which is preferred by him 
in order to reduce cost. (Nagarajan et al. 2010) also discussed Group Purchase 
Organization and offered a stable model under several scenarios. 
(Meca et al. 2007) had the same primary idea of production discount cost for a large 
order. The model was designed for n players joining their orders and sharing a 
warehouse while ordering in order to get the best out of the temporary discount offered 
by the supplier. The author then produced the p-additive game and showed it is 
balanced, and had a nonempty core allocation. 
Most of the presented researches were about joining items or orders, there are some 
models addressed sharing facilities and warehouses. (Tijs et al. 2005) had the model of 
sharing a warehouse. There are n players, to which player 0 has a warehouse, and players 
1,2,…,n  have items that needs to be stored. The author first showed a cooperative 
holding game and proved that it is a core allocation; then the author introduced the big 
boss holding game. The main goal is to find the optimum holding plan and how to 
allocate the cost. 
Another research with regards to facility sharing was (Guardiola et al. 2009)’s paper. 
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The author designed a cooperative model where the players within the coalition will 
produce at the cheapest production facility and will store at the cheapest warehouse. 
The author showed that the model is balanced but not concave. Then the author 
introduced the own point theory, where every player has to pay the minimum cost of 
operation. This theory was proved to be a unique fair allocation. 
There are not many researches addressing inventory game to reduce carbon 
emissions. In recent years, (van den Heuvel et al. 2012 and Kellner and Otto et al. 2012) 
had a similar idea of allocation carbon emission in transportation mode. Both papers 
showed a predesigned core allocation and showed the best method that can be applied 
to the proposed situation. 
 
2.4 Summary 
 
This chapter covered the review of carbon emission, sustainable operation, joint 
replenishment and inventory game. First, the focus was on carbon emission within 
supply chain and how to sustain the operations. Then the focus moved to joint 
replenishment in general descripting the method used and models. The usage of joint 
replenishment to reduce carbon emission was then mentioned and covered. Lastly, the 
focus moved to inventory game theory within supply chain management. There are not 
so many research addressing the allocation of carbon emission using inventory 
management. 
Adopting the researches of inventory game to allocate carbon emission under a 
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system where the incentive is reducing carbon emission only and neglecting the effect 
of cost can be a basic copy of previous models. Many researches addressed measuring 
and reducing carbon emission along with cost under joint replenishment method; but, 
not many addressed allocating carbon emissions. This thesis introduced several models 
in different systems and most of the researches had quite the same result. Many showed 
that carbon emission can be reduced will having a slight change in total cost. 
Next chapter describes the problem statement and what will be covered on this thesis. 
The basic models that are going to be used will also be introduced. 
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CHAPTER 3. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND BASIC 
MODEL 
 
In this chapter the problem statement of the research will be introduced along with the 
assumptions related to the case used and the formulation of the basic model that was 
introduced in previous work in the literature review. Section 3.1 will include the problem 
statement and assumptions, and section 3.2 will include the basic EOQ model 
formulation. 
 
3.1 Problem Statement 
 
 
Reducing carbon emissions became one of the cooperate strategies a firm is obligated 
to have now a days. The reduction of carbon emissions can be done in many ways, either 
by investment or by operational adjustments. Many firms can coordinate with other 
members to reduce carbon emissions or cooperate with one another. Cooperation, also 
known as joint replenishment, inventory pooling or shipment consolidation, in supply 
chain has three main advantages: risk pooling, negotiation power and reduction of the 
total cost. Many researches showed that the reduction of the total cost under cooperation 
for the supply chain can lead to a reduction of the total cost of each parties individually. 
The same concept can be applied to reduce carbon emissions if the goal of the cooperation 
was to reduce carbon emissions only without considering the cost. The main contribution 
of this thesis is to measure up to what extend supply chain cooperation can contribute to 
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carbon emission. The main question that can be addressed in this thesis is finding if 
cooperation can lead to a reduction in carbon emission. This can be seen as another 
advantage a firm can gain from cooperating. Another question will be, if cooperation can 
lead to a reduction, how these achieved savings would be allocated among the parties 
within the coalition\ game. 
The thesis contribution to the field will be that, under deterministic demand system, 
when n firms cooperate with incentive to reduce cost, they will produce an optimum 
ordering quantity that will lead to having the optimum total cost. The thesis will study if 
this optimum ordering quantity can be used in order to reduce carbon emissions as well 
within the same system. Showing that cooperation can have one more advantage that can 
be considered, many firms will think about cooperation as an option to save both cost and 
carbon emissions. The other contribution will be, following the game theory method, the 
thesis will provide a core allocation to this model in order to divide the obtained savings 
among the n parties within the game. 
The thesis is going to use the basic EOQ model for both centralized and decentralized 
supply chain. The used formula will consist of the ordering and holding costs to measure 
the total cost in both systems; the same will be applied to carbon emissions equation 
where it will consist of the ordering and holding emissions. No additional costs or 
emissions parameters to be handled in this model such as the purchase, backorders or 
fixed costs for simplicity purpose. In order to find the total carbon emission emitted from 
the system, an adjustment to the EOQ model to both centralized and decentralized supply 
chain formulas will be applied. The adjustment will be replacing the ordering and holding 
costs with ordering and holding emissions variables. In addition, it is assumed that the 
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emissions parameters are already calculated and provided. As for the Ordering quantity, 
the optimum ordering quantity of cost equation will be used into the emission equation, 
since it is assumed that all firms are going to minimize their total costs. 
Before building the model, some assumptions have to be made which are associated 
with the case environment.  It is assumed having a regular EOQ model for both systems 
as it is shown in figure 1(a)  and 1(b). The graph shows that in both decentralized and 
centralized systems, both systems will have a single supplier replenishing n retailers with 
a single item. The model is to be built under lot-sizing to which there is no left of inventory 
at the end of period. It is assumed that the demand is deterministic and known in 
advanced.  Since the demand is known, backorders are not allowed.  Moreover, the system 
will have a zero lead time in which orders will arrive at the time they were ordered. For 
simplicity, it is assumed that there is unlimited storage for inventory to be held and 
unlimited capacity for ordering. For all the centralized system, it is assumed that the firms 
will have one median who is going to arrange the shipment and consolidate them in order 
to place the orders. 
For the first part of the research, it is assumed that there is no regulations assigned with 
regards to carbon emissions. Carbon emissions will be measured to show the effect of 
joint replenishment model on carbon emission. Moving forward, regulation will be 
implemented to the model such as taxes, and the effect of these regulations will be 
analyzed and compared between the both systems. The same assumptions above will be 
applied to the modules in both systems while building up the extended tax model. The 
main objective is to know the effect of carbon tax regulation, on n firms under 
consolidation, on both cost and amount of carbon emissions where the incentive is to 
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(a) Decentralized Supply Chain 
 
(b) Centralized Supply Chain 
Figure 1. Illustration of Decentralized and centralized supply chain 
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reduce cost only. It is assumed that the tax rate is fixed per a unit of carbon emission 
emitted. Finally, to have a more realistic situation, the model will be built assuming that 
the truck should be fully loaded. This means that each order will have a fix capacity which 
is the truck size. Firms cannot order more or less that the specified capacity. 
 
3.1 Basic EOQ Model Formulation 
 
The model will be built in both decentralized and centralized systems where they will 
be compared in order to find the effect of cooperation on carbon emissions. The basic and 
regular EOQ model under cost context was already created and proved by many 
researches. This thesis is going to focus on the models that were built in both “the carbon-
constrained” article, (Chen et al. et al.2013) and “Inventory Games”, (Meca et al. et 
al.2004). 
For the basic inventory model in both systems, there are N firms, where N = {1, 2, ..., 
n}, joining their resources and consolidating their shipment process. Each firm i within 
N, it will have a deterministic demand (𝐷𝑖) in which 𝐷𝑖 ≥ 0. All N firms will be ordering 
from a single supplier, and it is assumed that there is unlimited capacity. The firms are 
not allowed to have backorders. And for simplicity, the lead time is equal to zero, which 
means there is no time between ordering and receiving the order. 
The cost equation will be divided into two parts:  ordering cost and holding cost.  
Ordering cost (A)   is the cost related to the fees required when placing an order from the 
supplier and A > 0. The cost will include the delivery cost along with some administration 
fees. For simplicity, it is assumed that the ordering cost (A) is fixed for all n firm and it 
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i 
does not get affected by the quantity to be ordered or the number of containers required. 
The second part will be the holding cost which will be the cost of holding or storing one 
unit of inventory in the warehouse per unit time. For the holding cost, each firm i will 
have a different cost for holding, donated as ℎ𝑖 where ℎ𝑖 > 0, that is because each firm 
will be storing and holding the items in their own warehouses and not a shared warehouse. 
Since the demand is deterministic and no out of stock or backorder is allowed, each 
firm i wants to order a quantity, donated as 𝑄𝑖, to replenish its stock to which it’ll satisfy 
the demand. Q∗ will be the optimal order quantity a firm will use to place an order in 
order to optimize the total cost. The frequency (𝑓𝑖) of placing an order per unit of time 
will be 𝐷𝑖/𝑄𝑖. A cycle is the time between replenishments and it can be found from 𝑄𝑖/𝐷𝑖. 
The average quantity per unit period can be donated as 𝑄𝑖/2. 
Both EOQ modules for firms under decentralized and centralized supply chain 
management in their basic inventory level are adapted from previous work and research 
mentioned in the literature review. The optimum cost equation is composed from ordering 
and holding cost. Since the demand is already known, the frequency of ordering (f) can 
be calculated as Demand (D) divided by the ordering quantity (Q). The ordering cost will 
be the total of the cost per order (A) multiplied by the frequency (f).  The second part of 
the cost will be the holding cost, which it will be the average of the quantity ordered 
multiplied by the holding cost (h). The total cost per unit time for one firm i for the basic 
Inventory    model, and based on (Chen et al. et al.2013), is given as 
𝐶 = 𝐴 
𝐷𝑖
𝑄𝑖
+ ℎ 
𝑄𝑖
2
 
(1) 
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The total cost of n firms under decentralization will be the summation of the costs for 
each firm i in N, since each firm is ordering separately and they are not attached. 
∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
 
(2) 
 Following on the above concept, the inventory model for n firms under 
consolidation is associated with ordering and holding costs.  The demand will be donated 
by Di, for every i ∈ N. Since all firms will consolidate their orders, the frequency will be   
√
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
2𝐴
  based on “inventory Game” paper, (Meca et al. et al.2004). Since the 
consolidation will be in the ordering only, each firm will store its goods by its own. The 
holding cost will be the average holding amount multiplied by the frequency of ordering. 
Since the holding amount will be less under consolidation, it’ll be influenced by the 
frequency of ordering. The equation will have the following form: 
𝐶𝐶
∗ = 𝐴 𝑓 +  
1
𝑓
 ∑
ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
2
𝑖⊑𝑁
 
(3) 
After finding the basic inventory model in both systems, the model to calculate the 
emissions within the supply chain will be developed. 
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CHAPTER 4. MODEL FORMULATION  
 
This chapter is going to follow the previous chapter to build carbon emissions 
measuring model under centralized and decentralized systems. Section 4.1 presents the 
basic carbon emissions model in decentralized system and how it is modified to be 
addressed.  Section 4.2 presents the same on centralized system. 4.3 shows the impact of 
the model and the system on carbon emissions. A comparison to both systems will be 
presented as well on the same section. Section 4.4 presents a numerical example of the 
formulated new carbon emissions models and the associated impact. 
 
4.1 Carbon Emission Model for Decentralized Supply Chain 
 
Following the previous chapter of defining the basic model and following the literature 
reviews, a formula that is similar to EOQ cost formula can be defined to calculate the 
total carbon emissions associated with placing an order. Since the total carbon emissions 
model consists of ordering and holding measurements, the yearly average carbon 
emissions can be calculated by donating ?̂?, ℎ̂ to be the amount of emissions to be emitted 
when ordering and holding a unit respectively. For firm i in a set of N firms, where N = 
{1, 2,…, n}, the ordering emission will be fixed for all N firms, as  ?̂? where  ?̂? > 0. That 
is because all firms are ordering from the same suppliers and no different charges will be 
applied to firms based on their location or method used for ordering. For the holding 
emissions of firm i, the emission will be donated as ℎ?̂? for each i ∈ N where ℎ?̂? > 0. The 
holding emissions will differ from a firm to another because each firm will store by its 
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d 
own and in its warehouse. In additions, all emission variables are pre-defined and 
measured. 
After defining the emission’s variables, in order to create the total carbon emissions 
model in the de- centralize system, the cost’s variables will be placed with the emission’s 
variables. This model will be used to calculate the total carbon emissions emitted from 
the systems by all the n parties. The formula will be as the following: 
𝐸𝑖 = ?̂? 
𝐷𝑖
𝑄𝑖
+ ℎ̂ 
𝑄𝑖
2
 
(4) 
The total carbon emissions for n firms working individually will simply be the 
summation of all carbon emissions emitted from the n firms: 
∑ 𝐸𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
 
(5) 
The above formula 5, can be used to measure the total carbon emission in a 
decentralized system; but it will measure the total optimum carbon emissions based on 
the emission’s variables. That is because the frequency, or optimum ordering quantity, 
used is the one obtained to minimize the total carbon emissions in the system. In order to 
find the amount of carbon emissions emitted from the system when firms’ incentive is to 
reduce the total cost, then the frequency obtained from the total cost formula, 𝐶𝑑
∗, should 
be used and placed in the carbon emission function. The total carbon emissions that is 
measured will be the effect of placing an order on carbon emissions within the 
decentralized system. The new total carbon emissions formula will be obtained as the 
following: 
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𝐸∏
𝑑 = ∑ ?̂? f𝑖 + ℎ̂𝑖  
𝑄𝑖
2
 
 
𝐸∏
𝑑 = ∑ ?̂?
 D𝑖
𝑄𝑖
+ ℎ̂𝑖  
𝑄𝑖
2
 
 
𝐸∏
𝑑 = ∑ ?̂?
 D𝑖
√
2𝐴𝐷𝑖
ℎ𝑖
+
ℎ̂𝑖
2
 √
2𝐴𝐷𝑖
ℎ𝑖
 
 
𝐸∏
𝑑 = ∑ ?̂?
 D𝑖√ℎ𝑖
√2𝐴𝐷𝑖
+
ℎ̂𝑖
2
 √
2𝐴𝐷𝑖
ℎ𝑖
 
 
𝐸∏
𝑑 = ∑ ?̂?
 √D𝑖ℎ𝑖
√2𝐴𝐷𝑖
+
ℎ̂𝑖
2
 √
2𝐴𝐷𝑖
ℎ𝑖
 
 
𝐸∏
𝑑 = ∑
𝐴
𝐴
̂  √D𝑖ℎ𝑖2𝐴
2
+
ℎ̂𝑖
ℎ𝑖
 
√2𝐴𝐷𝑖ℎ𝑖
2
 
 
𝐸∏
𝑑 = (
𝐴
𝐴
̂
) ∑
 𝐶𝑖
𝑑
2
+
1
2
∑(𝐶𝑖
𝑑 ℎ̂𝑖
ℎ𝑖
)  
(6) 
From the above total carbon emissions formula 6, it is shown that the ordering 
emission will be influenced by the total optimum cost effected by the ratio of the ordering 
cost over the ordering emission. Similar goes to the holding emission part; the part is 
influenced by the total optimum cost effected by the holding cost over the holding 
emissions. This means that the cost function can be a variable to measure, calculate and 
influence the amount of carbon emissions emitted from the systems. 
 
4.2 Carbon Emission Model For Centralized Supply Chain 
 
For N firms consolidating their shipment and working jointly under a centralized 
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system, the same concept that was found to obtain the total carbon emissions model in 
the decentralized system can be followed. The carbon emissions model will have two 
variables which are the ordering emission ?̂? and the holding emission ℎ̂. As it is known, 
the ordering emission will be fixed for all firms within the coalition while the holding 
emission will vary from a firm to another based on the storage techniques since each firm 
is storing its order individually. 
In order to create the model of measuring the total carbon emissions emitted in the 
centralized system, the cost variables, A and h, will be replaced by the emission variables, 
?̂? and ℎ̂. The carbon emission formula for centralization will be as the following: 
𝐸𝑐
∗ = ?̂? 𝑓 +
1
𝑓
∑
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
2
𝑖⊑𝑁
  
(7) 
 
Having the above model, 7, won’t be enough to calculate the total carbon emissions 
within the system since it will measure the total carbon emissions when the optimum 
ordering quantity is used to reduce carbon emissions. Based on the focus of the thesis, the 
total carbon emissions model needs to be amended in order to measure the amount of 
carbon emissions obtained based on the order placed in order to reduce the total cost. 
Similar to the previous section, the frequency, or optimum ordering quantity, used in the 
total carbon emissions equation will be replaced by the one obtained from the cost 
equation  𝐶𝑐
∗. The new total carbon emissions formula for centralized 𝐸∏
𝑐  can be derived 
as the following: 
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𝐸∏
𝑐 = ?̂? f +
1
𝑓
∑
ℎ̂𝑖
2
 𝐷𝑖 
 
𝐸∏
𝑐 = ?̂?√
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
2𝐴
+
1
√∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
2𝐴
∑
ℎ̂𝑖
2
 𝐷𝑖  
 
𝐸∏
𝑐 = ?̂?
√2𝐴 ∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
2𝐴
+
√2𝐴
√∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑
ℎ̂𝑖
2
 𝐷𝑖  
 
𝐸∏
𝑐 =
?̂?
𝐴
√2𝐴 ∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
2
+
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑ ℎ𝑖 𝐷𝑖
√2𝐴 ∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
2
 
 
𝐸∏
𝑐 = (
𝐴
𝐴
̂
)
 𝐶𝑐
∗
2
+
 𝐶𝑐
∗
2
[
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑ ℎ𝑖 𝐷𝑖
] 
(8) 
From the above carbon emissions formula in centralized system (8), the same 
observation can be made that the total carbon emissions model will be influenced and 
affected by the total cost in the centralized system. The ordering emission part will be 
influenced by the total cost in the centralized system affected by the ratio of the ordering 
emission to the ordering cost. The same thing goes for the holding part where the total 
cost is affected by the holding emission amount to the holding cost amount. As the cost 
increases, the total carbon emissions will increase as well. 
The main argument of this model is to find if joint replenishment can lead to a 
reduction in carbon emissions if n firms consolidated their shipment with the purpose of 
reducing cost only. As shown in the literature review, the total cost under cooperation is 
less than the total cost of firms working individually. The reduction of the cost was 
achieved after the amendment of the optimal ordering quantity which was calculated in 
order to find the optimum total cost of the supply chain as a whole and each party in the 
coalition. Similar results can be found if the N firms were to consider carbon emissions 
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and find an optimum ordering quantity that will minimize the total carbon emissions 
found along with reducing the total cost. However, the question will be, will it be greener 
for firms to consolidate their shipment and to benefit from the consolidation to reduce 
carbon emissions when they are cooperating to reduce cost only? 
 
4.3 The Impact On Carbon Emissions And Findings 
 
Based on the newly formed carbon emissions equations at (6) and (8), the total carbon 
emissions can be measured and compared to find out the impact of cooperation on carbon 
emissions. A new advantage can be listed to cooperation and give a motivation to firms 
to join their resources. After finding a reduction in carbon emissions under a cooperative 
system, it will assist in developing a theory to distribute this saving among all parties 
which is the second part of the thesis.  Both systems depend on the total optimum cost  of 
the supply chain; and as per the literature review, it was stated that total cost under 
consolidation will always be less than total cost for firms working individually. In this 
subsection, the impact of calculating carbon emissions on firms under consolidation will 
be examined. 
Before moving to find the savings of carbon emission obtained from both systems, it 
will be shown how cooperation can always lead to a reduction in cost (Meca et al. et 
al.2004).  The cost function can be expressed as (∑ 𝐶𝑖
∗ =  ∑ √2𝐴ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖)  in the 
decentralized system, and to be expressed as (𝐶𝑐
∗ =  √2𝐴 ∑(ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖)) in the centralized 
system. By comparing both models, it is clear that the centralized system will be less that 
the decentralized system as the square root of a summation is always lower than the 
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summation of the square root. The comparisons can be equivalent to: 
 
Decentralized formula: Centralized formula:        
∑ √ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖                       ≥                       √∑ 𝐷𝑖ℎ𝑖
𝑛𝑛
 
(9) 
Theoretically, cooperation can actually assist in reducing carbon emissions as well for 
several reasons. Based on the proposed scenario, all n firms will consolidate their 
shipment and order less frequently to reduce the ordering cost. By ordering less 
frequently, then the amount of carbon emissions that will be emitted from the centralized 
system should be less than the decentralized system since the ordering part is affected by 
the number of orders. As for the holding part, since the amount to be held within each 
firm will be reduced since the quantity ordered will be reduced, then the total holding 
emission will be reduced as well. In other words, the number of stored items are less, and 
the holding emissions are measured based on the stored items. Since both parts are proved 
to be less in the centralized system, then the cooperation can actually lead to a reduction. 
This concept can be proved mathematically and can be found in the coming 
proposition. The proposition States that  𝐸∏
𝐶  will always be lower than    𝐸∏
𝑑  in all 
conditions.   By having N firms consolidating their shipment, this can lead to a reduction 
in both the total cost and the total carbon emissions.  
Proposition 1. Cooperation can always lead to a reduction in carbon emissions. 
 
𝐸∏
𝑑 = (
𝐴
𝐴
̂
) ∑
 𝐶𝑖
𝑑
2
+
1
2
∑ (𝐶𝑖
𝑑 ℎ̂𝑖
ℎ𝑖
)   ≥   𝐸∏
𝑐 = (
𝐴
𝐴
̂
)
 𝐶𝑐
∗
2
+
 𝐶𝑐
∗
2
[
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑ ℎ𝑖 𝐷𝑖
] 
(10) 
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Proof: in order to prove the above proposition, both equation 6 and equation 8 will be 
compared to find the gap from the total carbon emissions in centralized and decentralized 
supply chains. Finding the gap can be used in order to find the effect of joint 
replenishment on carbon emissions. 
Both models can be divided into ordering and holding emissions and analyze each part 
separately. For the ordering emissions part, it is clear mathematically that the ordering 
emissions in the centralization is lower than the decentralization, where the ordering 
emissions part can be simplified as the following: 
Decentralized formula: Centralized formula:        
(
?̂?
𝐴
) ∑
√2𝐴ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
2
                      ≥                       (
?̂?
𝐴
)
√2𝐴 ∑ 𝐷𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑛
2
𝑛
 
(11) 
(
?̂?
𝐴
) ∑
√ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
2
                      ≥                       (
?̂?
𝐴
)
√∑ 𝐷𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑛
2
𝑛
 
(12) 
 
Equation (12) can be proved as the following: the first reason, ordering emission relays 
on the total cost of both centralized and decentralized systems. Moreover, as mentioned 
earlier, it was proven that the total cost in centralized is always smaller than the total cost 
in decentralized supply chin. Second, since the ratio of ordering emission  (
?̂?
𝐴
) is constant 
for both models and both A and ?̂? ≥0, the ratio can never be negative. Therefore, it is 
clear that cooperation can lead to a reduction in the ordering emissions. 
The challenge will be on total holding emission part. The variables are not equal in 
both systems and it will be hard to spot the gap as it was on ordering emission part. Since 
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the variables are not equal and hard to be simplified, both equations will be compared as 
following: 
Decentralized formula: Centralized formula:        
∑
𝐶𝑖
𝑑
2
ℎ̂𝑖
ℎ𝑖
                                ?                            
𝐶𝑐
∗
2
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
 
 
∑
√2𝐴ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
2
ℎ̂𝑖
ℎ𝑖
                    ?             
√2𝐴 ∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
2
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
 
 
 
The ordering cost is constant and can be omitted; and in order to have an equivalent 
equation, the decentralized function will be multiplied by 
𝐷𝑖
𝐷𝑖
 .The questions can be 
equivalent to: 
∑ √ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
                    ?             √∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
 
 
∑
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
√ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
                    ?             
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
√∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
 
 
∑ √
(ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)2
ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
                    ?             √
(∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)2
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
 
(13) 
Based on the above comparison, it is shown that holding emission under centralized 
system is less than holding emission in decentralized system. That is because the square 
root of a summation is smaller than the summation of a square root when both equations 
have identical variables. Since it was proved that holding emission is also less in 
centralized system and it was showed before that the ordering emission is less in the 
centralized system as well, then it is approved that carbon emissions under centralized 
system is always less and this proves the proposition. 
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To show the effect of consolidation on carbon emissions, the delta change of carbon 
emissions will be compared to the delta change in cost. The comparison can show by how 
much carbon emissions can be affected by the change on the total costs. The delta change 
for both carbon emissions and cost can be found as the following: 
Delta carbon emissions: 
∆𝐸 =  
𝐸𝑀𝑑 − 𝐸𝑀𝑐
𝐸𝑀𝑑
 
Delta Cost: 
∆𝐶 =  
𝐶𝑑
∗ −  𝐶𝐶
∗
𝐶𝑑
∗  
The above delta change in both carbon emissions and total cost will be compared based 
on several variables that has an effect on the systems. First, both deltas will be compared 
and calculated based on the change of the ordering cost and ordering emissions. Then, 
they will be compared based on the holding emissions and holding costs. 
First, the effect of ordering cost and ordering emissions will be measures. From graph 
2 which represents the effect of changing ordering cost on both the delta change in carbon 
emissions and delta change in cost, it shows that the variable will only have an effect on 
the delta change in carbon emissions. The reason will be because in the delta change in 
cost, the ordering cost is constant and can be omitted from the delta function as it is 
presented below: 
∆𝐶 =  
𝐶𝑑
∗ −  𝐶𝐶
∗
𝐶𝑑
∗  
∆𝐶 =  1 −  
∑ √2𝐴ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
√2𝐴 ∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
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∆𝐶 =  1 − 
∑ √ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
√∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Delta Changes of carbon emissions and costs relative to ordering cost 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Delta Changes of carbon emissions and costs relative to ordering emissions 
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Figure 4. Delta Changes of carbon emissions and costs relative to holding cost 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Delta Changes of carbon emissions and costs relative to holding emissions 
 
On the other hands, the larger the value of the ordering cost will be, the lower the delta 
change on carbon emissions will be until it will reach a flat status. As for the ordering 
emissions variable shown in graph 3, this variable as well will only have an effect on the 
delta change in carbon emissions but not the delta change in cost because the variable is 
not part of the cost model. 
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For the holding emissions and holding costs, it is assumed that the gap between the 
firms is fixed and won’t change with the increment or decrement of the value of the 
holding cost or emissions. Having this, when comparing both deltas with regards to 
holding cost and holding emissions as presented in graph 4 and 5 respectively. It is shown 
that holding cost will have an effect on both delta change in carbon emissions and costs. 
The larger the value will be, the greater the delta change in cost will be and the lower the 
delta change in carbon emission will be. As for the holding emission, it will have an effect 
on carbon emissions only that is because holding emission is not a variable in the cost 
model. The larger the holding emissions will get the greater the delta change on carbon 
emissions will be. The delta change can be almost flat after a certain value. 
The above proportion and the delta change suggests that there will be a saving from 
the total carbon emission if firms decided to joint their resources. If two or more firms 
consolidated their shipment, then they can do better than having each one of them working 
individually. To that end, how to allocate the carbon emissions saving among firms; this 
will be discussed on the next chapter. In the following section, a numerical example of 
the provided equations found in this section will be presented. 
 
4.4 Numerical Example 
 
A numerical example can be provided to show that the designed model can actually 
lead to a reduction in carbon emissions. The provided example will be a simple one for 
clarification purpose only where three retailers will be considered and these retailers are 
joining their shipment and ordering one type of an item from one supplier. The demand 
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of each retail varies from one to another. The holding costs are not equal as well due to 
different storage facilities. The ordering cost is the same since it is a fixed cost to be paid 
to the supplier (different ordering costs based on the location of the retail and trip rout 
will not be assumed). The results will show the effect on frequencies, total costs and total 
emissions in both systems. Moreover, the delta change in emission and cost will be 
presented and compared. 
 
Table 1.Numerical example for centralized and decentralized carbon emissions and cost 
Retailer 𝑫𝒊 𝒉𝒊 A ?̂? 𝒉?̂? 𝑬𝒊 𝑬𝒏 𝑪𝒊 𝑪𝒏 
1 100 6 20 30 20 374.39 - 154.92 - 
2 800 1 20 30 10 1,028.591 - 178.89 - 
3 700 1 20 30 30 2635.48 - 167.33 - 
Total 4,038.46 2,356.57 501.14 289.83 
 
 
In table 1, the various values of each variable are presented. The numbers that are 
provided are random values selected based on previous literature researches. After 
Computing the total carbon emissions based on the provided variables and the total cost 
for each firm working individually, it is found that firm 1 emits 374.39 and pays $154.92, 
firm2 emits 1,028.591 and pays $178.89 and firms 3 emits 2,635.48 and pays $167.33. 
The total carbon emissions of the decentralized system will be 4,038.46. If firms were to 
work together, the total carbon emissions of the supply chain will be 2,356.57 to which it 
is a considerable save. The total cost in the decentralized system is $501.14 and when 
firms working jointly, the total cost will be reduced to $289.83. The numerical example 
provided in table 1 showed that cooperation can assist firms to reduce cost along with 
56 
 
carbon emissions. 
Based on the above calculations and numbers, the delta change in carbon emissions 
can be calculated and compared based on the provided example. 
∆𝐸 =  
𝐸𝑀𝑑− 𝐸𝑀𝑐
𝐸𝑀𝑑
 =  
4,038.46 − 2,356.57
4,038.46
 = 0.416 
(14) 
∆𝐶 =  
𝐶𝑑
∗− 𝐶𝐶
∗
𝐶𝑑
∗  =  
501.14  289.83
501.14
 = 0.422 
(15) 
The delta change in carbon emissions and cost did not differ much. Cooperation had 
an effect on supply chain by reducing carbon emissions by 41.6% and reducing cost by 
42.2%. The delta change for both cost and carbon emissions where almost within the same 
range of value. 
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CHAPTER 5. CARBON EMISSION ALLOCATION 
 
This chapter is going to show how to allocate the saving from carbon emission to the 
participated parties. In section 5.1, a core allocation model will be presented in order to 
allocate the achieved savings based on the grand allocation properties. Following the 
model, numerical example will be applied in section 5.2. 
 
5.1 Core Allocation of Carbon Emission 
 
After finding that cooperation can lead to a reduction in carbon emissions, the 
challenge may lay on allocating this saving among the firms that participated in the 
shipment consolidation. Allocation should be based on fairness where each firm should 
find an incentive to join. Fairness can be a relative matter, but it can somehow be 
calculated so that each firm benefits based on its contribution to the game. Even though 
it was showed that consolidation can be a cost effective and reduces emission, it does not 
mean that all firms participating in the consolidation can have a great payoff. Some firms 
can be doing better by working individually, while others can be better off working with 
a smaller set rather than the whole group. This theory is called “Game theory.” As it was 
discussed in the literature review, the Game should assure fairness and stability to which 
there should be no firm or set of firms to break out of the game and start to work 
individually or to form another set where they can be better off. 
A grand coalition in the game should consist N players, where N = 1, 2, ..., n. There 
should be a coalition S, where S ⊂ N ,and S = 1, 2, ..., s. The number of coalitions that 
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can be established from the grand coalition should reach 2n − 1.  The Game can have 
some characteristics in which it can be supper-additive, if for all disjoint sets S,T we have: 
E(S) + E(T ) ≥ E(S ∪ T ) 
(16) 
This means that every two subsets can do better if they consolidated their resources. 
The larger the coalition is, the larger the savings will be. The game is denoted by (N,v) 
and an allocation is a value that divides the saving X = 𝑥1, 𝑥2, ..., 𝑥𝑖 where each player 
receives 𝑋𝑖 value and the core has the following properties: 
 Individual rationality: the assigned amount of carbon emissions emitted for 
firm i should be less than or at most equal to the total carbon emissions emitted 
by the firm working individually. 
𝑋𝑖  ≤ v(i)(∀i) (17) 
Where 𝑥1 is the emission assigned to firm i and V(i) is the amount firm i emits in 
standalone case. 
 Collective Rationality: the cost should be allocated in a way to which no 
group would like to leave and that each subset of players should not do better 
than the grand coalition. 
 ∑ 𝑋𝑖 𝑖 ∈𝑆 ≤ v(S)(∀S ⊂ N )  (18) 
 Efficiency: To divide all cost among players in the grand coalitions. 
∑ 𝑋𝑖 𝑖 ∈𝑁  = V (N ) (19) 
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To facilitate finding a core allocation to the model, the above properties has to be 
followed to assure fairness to the game. Fairness means that each player is satisfied with 
the allocation and the amount he should pay based on his contribution to the game. The 
carbon emission model that is going to be used to which it was donated as (N,E) is 
presented as the following: 
𝐸𝑀𝑐 =  
√2𝐴𝐻𝐷
2
(
?̂?
𝐴
+
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
 
(20) 
First, the thesis is going to prove that the proposed model is supper-additive for all S 
⊂ N to which E(S) + E(T ) ≥ E(S ∪ T ), for all S, T ⊂ N and S ∩ T = φ. 
Proposition 2. The emission function is supper-additive function for all S ⊂ N to which 
E(S) + E(T ) ≥ E(S ∪ T ), for all S, T ⊂ N and S ∩ T = φ. 
Proof: There is a subset S and T where they are non-empty and disjoint: 
E(S) + E(T) =  
𝐶(𝑠)
2
(
?̂?
𝐴
+  
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑ ℎ𝑖 𝐷𝑖
) +
𝐶(𝑇)
2
 (
?̂?
𝐴
+  
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑ ℎ𝑖 𝐷𝑖
)  
 
=  
√2𝐴
2 √
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑆
(
?̂?
𝐴
+  
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑆
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑆
) +
√2𝐴
2 √
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑇
 (
?̂?
𝐴
+  
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑇
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑇
) 
 
=  
√2𝐴
2
(√∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑆 +  √∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑇 )((
?̂?
𝐴
) + (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑆
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑆
+
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑇
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑇
))  
≥
√2𝐴
2
 √∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑆∪𝑇  (
?̂?
𝐴
) + (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑆∪𝑇
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑆∪𝑇
) =   𝐸(𝑆 ∪ 𝑇) (21) 
The proposition implies that the provided model is indeed supper-additive which 
means that any two or more parties can do better off if they collide with a bigger group 
than working by themselves. Any player can benefit by joining a larger group than 
working individually or with a smaller group. The bigger the group is, the better the 
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payoff will be. 
By considering that the carbon emission model is the base to have a fair distribution 
and by following the core allocation rules, a model to distribute the carbon emissions 
among all parties can be formulated. An interesting solution for this game can be 
proportional allocation. This proportional allocation to be divided into two parts. The first 
part will be a proportion allocation of the ordering emission and the second part will be a 
proportional allocation of the holding emission. Since both parts are joint with an addition 
sign, then it will be easy to split the model to find a core allocation. The allocation, X, 
will be the summation of all the distributed cost to all firms resulted from the composition 
function. 
Before trying to find a core allocation function, the carbon emissions function will be 
simplified. The cost function can also be expressed as 2afn. For simplicity, the carbon 
emissions function is going be expressed by placing the frequency instead of the cost 
variable. The above mentioned expression can be replaced for the ordering emission part, 
while for the holding emission part the cost can be replaced by 
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑓𝑛
.  
Dividing the model into two parts, for the ordering emissions part 
𝐶𝑛
2
(
?̂?
𝐴
), Cn is going 
to be replaced with 2Afn. By doing this, the ordering emission function can be simplified 
to be ?̂?fn. It is clear that the ordering emission part is affected by the frequencies to which 
a proportional allocation for the ordering emission can be, distributing the carbon 
emissions based on the optimal number of orders (frequency) that had been requested by 
each party.  The allocated function of the ordering emission that should be handled by 
each party will be as the following: 
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𝑋𝑖
𝑜 =  
𝑓𝑖
2
𝑓𝑛2
 ?̂?𝑓𝑛 
(22) 
Given that √∑ 𝑓𝑗
2
𝑛  equals to fn, it can be used as the base of the proportional allocation 
to prove that the function is a core allocation to the ordering emission. The proof is 
presented below: 
Proposition 3.  The  𝑋𝑖
𝑜 = (𝑥1
𝑜, ..., 𝑥𝑛
𝑜 ) ∈ℝ𝑛 assigned to each retailer i is a core allocation 
for N players. 
Proof: For All i ∈ N, 𝑋𝑖  = 
𝑓𝑖
2
𝑓𝑛
2  ?̂?𝑓𝑛 in which it satisfies the following: 
1. Individual rationality: for every i∈ 𝑁 , 𝑁𝑁 ≥ 𝑁 . Then 𝑋𝑜   = 
𝑓𝑖
2
𝑓𝑛
2  ?̂?𝑓𝑛  = 
√𝑓𝑖
2
√𝑓𝑛
2
 ?̂?𝑓𝑛  = 
𝑓𝑖
𝑓𝑛
 ?̂?𝑓𝑛 = ?̂?𝑓𝑖 ≤ ?̂?𝑓𝑖 = E(i)  
2. Efficiency: X(N) = ∑ 𝑋𝑖
𝑜
𝑖∈𝑁 = 
∑ 𝑓𝑛 𝑖
2
𝑓𝑛
2  ?̂?𝑓𝑛 = 
√∑ 𝑓𝑛 𝑖
2
√𝑓𝑛
2
 ?̂?𝑓𝑛= ?̂?𝑓𝑛 = E(n)  
3. Collective rationality: For All 𝜙 ⊂ 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑁, 𝑋𝑠
𝑜 =  ∑ 𝑋𝑖
𝑜 = 𝑖∈𝑆
∑ 𝑓𝑠 𝑖
2
𝑓𝑛
2  ?̂?𝑓𝑛  = 
∑ 𝑓𝑠 𝑖
2
𝑓𝑛
 ?̂?  = 
√∑ 𝑓𝑠 𝑖
2
√𝑓𝑛
 ?̂?   ≤  ?̂?𝑓𝑆 = 𝐸(𝑆) 
The above is a proof that the first part is indeed a core allocation to the ordering 
emission of this model. For the second part of the allocation the same concept will be 
followed by replacing the cost function with 
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑓𝑛
. The purpose of the replacement is to 
reduce the number of variables within the equation in order to find a core allocation. The 
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holding function will now be simplified to 
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑓𝑛
 (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
) and to be simplified further to 
become (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑓𝑛
). After re-expressing the holding emission part, it is clear that the part will 
be affected by the holding emission amount to which it will be easier to proportionally 
distribute the emission based on the holding emission value for each firm. A core 
allocation of the holding emission part can be expressed as: 
𝑋𝑖
ℎ =  
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
 (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2𝑓𝑛
) 
It can be proved that this holding emission allocation is a core allocation for this part 
by showing the following: 
Proposition 4.  The 𝑋𝑖
ℎ = (𝑥1
ℎ, ..., 𝑥𝑛
ℎ ) ∈ ℝ𝑛 assigned to each retailer i is a core allocation 
for N players. 
Proof: For All i ∈ N, 𝑋𝑖
ℎ =  
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
 (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2𝑓𝑛
) in which it satisfies the following: 
1. Individual rationality: for every i ∈ 𝑁 , 𝑁𝑁 ≥ 𝑁 . Then 𝑥𝑖 =  
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
 (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2𝑓𝑛
)  = 
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
2𝑓𝑛
 ≤ 
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
2𝑓𝑖
= 𝐸(𝑖).   
2. Efficiency: X(N) = ∑ 𝑋𝑖
ℎ
𝑖∈𝑁 = ∑
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
 (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2𝑓𝑛
) 𝑛 = (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2𝑓𝑛
) = 𝐸(𝑛).  
3. Collective rationality: For All 𝜙 ⊂ 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑁, 𝑋𝑠
ℎ =  ∑ 𝑋𝑖
ℎ = 𝑖∈𝑆 ∑
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
 (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2𝑓𝑛
)𝑠 = 
(
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠
2𝑓𝑛
) ≤  (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠
2𝑓𝑠
) = 𝐸(𝑠) 
After finding and proving that both parts are a core allocation to the model, both part 
will be joint to formulate the total carbon emission amount to be paid for each player i 
within the game: 
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𝑋𝑖 =
𝑓𝑖
2
𝑓𝑛2
 ?̂?𝑓𝑛 +  
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
 (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2𝑓𝑛
) 
(24) 
Since Xi is the summation on the ordering and holding part, then the proof that it is a 
core allocation will follow the same principles used above. The above function X will be 
the amount of carbon emissions each firm will be charged for if they consolidated their 
shipment. Proposition 5 will show that equation 24 is a core allocation of the system. 
Proposition 5.  The 𝑋 = (𝑋𝑖, ..., 𝑋𝑛 ) ∈ ℝ
𝑛 assigned to each retailer i is a core allocation 
for N players. 
Proof: For All i ∈ N, 𝑥𝑖 =  
𝑓𝑖
2
𝑓𝑛
2  ?̂?𝑓𝑛 +  
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
 (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2𝑓𝑛
) in which it satisfies the following: 
1. Individual rationality: for every i ∈ 𝑁, 𝑁𝑁 ≥ 𝑁 . Then 𝑋𝑖
ℎ =  
𝑓𝑖
2
𝑓𝑛
2  ?̂?𝑓𝑛 +
 
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
 (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2𝑓𝑛
) =
√𝑓𝑖
2
√𝑓𝑛
2
 ?̂?𝑓𝑛 + 
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
2𝑓𝑛
=   
𝑓𝑖
𝑓𝑛
 ?̂?𝑓𝑛 +  
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
2𝑓𝑛
=  ?̂?𝑓𝑖 +  
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
2𝑓𝑛
≤  ?̂?𝑓𝑖 +  
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
2𝑓𝑖
=
𝐸(𝑖).   
2. Efficiency: X(N) = ∑ 𝑋𝑖
ℎ
𝑖∈𝑁 = 
∑ 𝑓𝑛 𝑖
2
𝑓𝑛
2  ?̂?𝑓𝑛 + ∑
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
 (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2𝑓𝑛
) 𝑛 = 
√∑ 𝑓𝑛 𝑖
2
√𝑓𝑛
2
 ?̂?𝑓𝑛 +
 (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2𝑓𝑛
) =  ?̂?𝑓𝑛 + (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2𝑓𝑛
) = 𝐸(𝑛).  
3. Collective rationality: For All 𝜙 ⊂ 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑁,  𝑋𝑠
ℎ =  ∑ 𝑋𝑖
ℎ = 𝑖∈𝑆
∑ 𝑓𝑠 𝑖
2
𝑓𝑛
2  ?̂?𝑓𝑛 +
∑
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
 (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2𝑓𝑛
)𝑠 = 
∑ 𝑓𝑠 𝑖
2
𝑓𝑛
 ?̂? + (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠
2𝑓𝑛
) =  
√∑ 𝑓𝑠 𝑖
2
√𝑓𝑛
 ?̂? + (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠
2𝑓𝑛
) ≤  ?̂?𝑓𝑠 +
(
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠
2𝑓𝑠
) = 𝐸(𝑠) 
The above proposition is a proof that the proposed emission allocation model is a core 
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allocation to the system, where its individual rationality, efficiency and collective 
rationality was proved. No individuals nor subsets would leave the coalition to form 
another coalition where it will do a better off than the grand coalition. All firms will be 
paying less if they joint the grand coalition than when working individually or in a sub 
coalition. All parties in this group will benefit from reducing the total cost of the supply 
chain and carbon emissions as well. 
 
5.2 Numerical Example 
 
Based on a core allocation model presented in the previous section, a numerical 
example will be presented to show that the above model is a core allocation and follows 
all properties. The example and the provided values presented in table (2) are the same as 
the previously introduced example in section 4.4. The example is going to have three 
companies that consolidated their shipment to reduce the overall supply chain cost and 
got the total carbon emissions reduced as well, and they want to divide the achieved 
savings from carbon emissions fairly. 
The ordering cost and ordering emission are fixed values among all parties for every 
time an order is placed. Each firm will have a different demand, and each firm will have 
different holding cost and holding emission since the warehouses are not shared. As it 
was assumed, there will be one item that is going to be ordered and it is going to be 
ordered from one supplier. 
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Table 2.Variables of the consolidated system 
Retailer Di hi A Aˆ hˆi 
1 100 6 20 30 20 
2 800 1 20 30 10 
3 700 1 20 30 30 
 
Table 3. Carbon emissions amount emitted for the possible coalitions 
E(1) 374.3884 E(2) 1028.591 
E(3) 2635.479 E(1,2) 1022.637 
E(1,3) 2188.26 E(2,3) 2551.552 
E(1,2,3) 2356.574 
 
 
Table 3 shows the value of carbon emissions for all the possible coalitions that can be 
formed along with the grand coalition. Based on these numbers, if each firm worked on 
its own, then the total carbon emissions will be as the following: E1 = 374.3884 , E2 = 
1028.591 and E3= 2635.479 with each having a frequency (f= d/Q) of 3.9, 4.5 and 4.2 
orders/year respectively. If firms started to work in a group and join their shipment, then 
the carbon emission will be reduced. From the numerical example, it is noticed that the 
larger the group will be, the greater the savings will be. 
Having the total carbon emissions in the grand coalition, the total carbon emission can 
be allocated to all firms within the coalition fairly and based on the proposed model. In 
the ground coalitions, the total frequency of orders will be 7.25 orders/years. The 
proportional allocation of the carbon emissions of the firms E1,E2, and E3 for each 
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individual and based on the core allocation will be as the following: X1 = 200.119 , X2 = 
634.8603, X3 = 1521.595. 
From the provided numbers, the difference and the savings from both system is 
noticeable.  The total frequencies was reduced from 12.6 orders/ year in the decentralized 
system to 7.25 order/ year for the centralized system.  Along with that, each firm benefited 
from the cooperation that the amount of carbon emissions they are entitled to reduce 
significantly. Moreover, each firm will have to pay a cost of C1=$89.59608, C2= 
$103.4566, and C3=$96.77482 where the used to pay C1= $154.92, C2= $178.89 and 
C3=$167.33 in the decentralized system. 
The numerical example showed that cooperation can help in reducing the total 
frequencies of ordering. And thus, the total carbon emissions can be reduced for the whole 
supply chain and individuals within the cooperation. In addition, the total cost will also 
be saved for the supply chain as a whole and individuals. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONSOLIDATION UNDER CARBON TAX 
REGULATION.  
 
This chapter will demonstrate how the model can be extended to handle some of the 
carbon emissions regulations, and how the regulations will have an effect on carbon 
emissions. Section 6.1 presents the formulation of carbon emission model under tax 
regulation. Section 6.2 shows the findings and the savings from both systems. Core 
allocation of the savings will be found in section 6.3. 
 
6.1 Model formulation 
 
Regulations on supply chain can play a major role with regards to the cost and ordering 
quantity and the effect of these changes on carbon emissions. The chapter will measure 
the effect of carbon emission under consolidation with the presence of tax regulation. 
However, the incentive of the cooperation will be reducing the total cost of the system. 
Carbon tax is one type of regularity policy where the government imposes a financial 
penalty per carbon unit that had been emitted by the firm. Imposing this kind of penalty 
can help in reducing and controlling carbon emissions throughout the supply chain. There 
are several types of carbon taxes that can be imposed on firms in which depends on the 
structure of the supply chain or the business. The most used types of carbon taxes are the 
fixed tax rate which is imposing penalty for every unit of carbon emissions that had been 
emitted. Linear tax rate is imposing a rate to all tax players and it can increase based on 
the quantity. A nonlinear tax rate is where the tax rate changes with regards to carbon 
quantity. 
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In this section of the research, carbon tax will be added into the model and study its 
effect on the fixed tax value. All assumptions that were introduced in section 3.1 are going 
to be applicable in this model. The tax rate will be a fixed value that is given and known. 
For simplicity purpose, the tax value will be applied to every carbon that had been emitted 
from the supply chain. 
Since tax rate is a form of a money value, it can be considered as part of the cost 
equation. The cost function can be enhanced in both centralized and decentralized systems 
to accommodate the tax cost value associated with the carbon emissions that had been 
emitted within the supply chain. Let’t’ donates the tax rate that is going to be paid for 
every unit emitted and t > 0. Then the new total cost function for firms under 
decentralization and centralization will be as the following: 
∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑑 =  ∑(𝐴
𝐷𝑖
𝑄𝑖
+ ℎ𝑖
𝑄𝑖
2
+ 𝑡𝐸𝑖
𝑑)
𝑛
𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
 (25) 
Total cost function for firms under centralization: 
𝑇𝑐
∗ = 𝐴𝑓 +  
1
𝑓
∑
ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
2
+ 𝑡𝐸Π
𝑐
𝑖⊆𝑁
 (26) 
If t = 0, then no changes will be applied to the cost in both cases and carbon emissions 
can be neglected by the firms. If t > 0, then the firm will have 2 options. Option 1 will be 
to neglect the increase in cost especially if the increase was not significant and pay the 
penalty. Neglecting the cost, means that the firm will have the regular EOQ model and 
will be placing orders based on the ordering quantity that will reduce the total cost and 
then add to it the extra fees for the tax. Option 2 will be to reduce carbon emissions from 
the processes that emits carbon emissions the most and are accountable for the increase 
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in the cost. The reduction of carbon emissions can be in terms of investing on tools that 
will reduce carbon emissions, or by simply adjusting the operation or the ordering 
quantity and frequency to adjust the added carbon tax cost. Both cost equations in both 
systems depend on ordering quantity Q which will affect the total cost. The firms can 
adjust the optimum ordering quantity Q∗ to which it minimizes the new total cost T c and 
T d. 
As for Q∗ under decentralization, the formula was calculated and according to 
previous work stated on chapter 2, Q =  √
2(𝐴+𝑡?̂?)𝐷𝑖
ℎ𝑖+𝑡ℎ̂𝑖
 
As for centralization, the new 𝑄𝑡
∗  will be 𝑄𝑡
∗ = 𝐷𝑖 √
2(𝐴+𝑡?̂?)
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖+𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
 and was driven 
according to the following:  
𝑇𝑐
∗ = 𝐴𝑓 +  
1
𝑓
∑
ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
2
+ 𝑡𝐸Π
𝑐
𝑖⊆𝑁
 
 
𝑇𝑐
∗ = 𝐴
𝐷𝑖
𝑄𝑖
+ 
𝑄𝑖
𝐷𝑖
∑
ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
2
+ 𝑡(
𝑖⊆𝑁
?̂?
𝐷𝑖
𝑄𝑖
+  
𝑄𝑖
𝐷𝑖
∑
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
2
)
𝑖⊆𝑁
 
 
𝑇𝑐
∗ = 𝐴
𝐷𝑖
𝑄𝑖
+  
𝑄𝑖
𝐷𝑖
∑
ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
2
+ 𝑡
𝑖⊆𝑁
?̂?
𝐷𝑖
𝑄𝑖
+  𝑡
𝑄𝑖
𝐷𝑖
∑
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
2
𝑖⊆𝑁
 
 
In order to find 𝑄𝑡
∗, the equation to be derived with regards to Q. 
𝑑(𝑇)
𝑑𝑄
= 𝐴
𝐷𝑖
𝑄𝑖
+  
𝑄𝑖
𝐷𝑖
∑
ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
2
+ 𝑡
𝑖⊆𝑁
?̂?
𝐷𝑖
𝑄𝑖
+  𝑡
𝑄𝑖
𝐷𝑖
∑
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
2
𝑖⊆𝑁
 
 
𝑑(𝑇)
𝑑𝑄
= −𝐴
𝐷𝑖
𝑄𝑖
2 + 
1
𝐷𝑖
∑
ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
2
− 𝑡
𝑖⊆𝑁
?̂?
𝐷𝑖
𝑄𝑖
2 +  𝑡
1
𝐷𝑖
∑
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
2
𝑖⊆𝑁
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−𝐴
𝐷𝑖
𝑄𝑖
2 − 𝑡?̂?
𝐷𝑖
𝑄𝑖
2  =  −
1
𝐷𝑖
∑
ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
2
𝑖⊆𝑁
−  𝑡
1
𝐷𝑖
∑
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
2
𝑖⊆𝑁
 
 
−
𝐷𝑖
𝑄𝑖
2 (𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)  =  −
1
2𝐷𝑖
(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑖⊆𝑁
−  𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)
𝑖⊆𝑁
 
 
−𝐷𝑖(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)2𝐷𝑖  =  −𝑄𝑖
2(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑖⊆𝑁
−  𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)
𝑖⊆𝑁
 
 
2𝐷𝑖
2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)
(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑖⊆𝑁 −  𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)𝑖⊆𝑁
 =  𝑄𝑖
2
 
 
𝑄𝑡
∗ = 𝐷𝑖  √
2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
 
 
 
The total optimal 𝑄𝑡
∗will be ∑ 𝑄𝑖
𝑡.  
From the newly funded optimum quantity, the value will be affected by the ordering 
and holding emissions along with the ordering and holding costs. The change in the 
emissions variables will have an effect on the ordering quantity and the total cost. 
Moreover, the carbon tax rate will also play a role in deciding the number of quantities to 
be replenished within each order. 
Using the above Q value, the cost equation can be simplified. For the decentralized 
system, the equation will be 𝑇𝑖
d =  √2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)𝐷𝑖(ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡 ℎ̂𝑖). For more simplification, 
the equation will have Ã variable to present the formula of 2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?) and 𝐻?̃? variable to 
present the formula of (ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡 ℎ̂𝑖). The new cost for the decentralized system will be: 
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∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑑
𝑛
=  ∑ √2?̃?𝐷𝑖?̃?𝑖
𝑛
 
(27) 
 Same concept will be followed for the centralized system.  The cost equation can be 
presented as 𝑇𝐶
∗ =  √2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑖⊆𝑁 −  𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)𝑖⊆𝑁 . The equation can be 
simplified by the presentation of Ã. In the centralized system, 𝐻𝑖̅̅ ̅ will be used to express 
the formula(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑖⊆𝑁 −  𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)𝑖⊆𝑁 . The cost equation will have the following form 
𝑇𝐶
∗ =  √2?̃?𝐻𝑖̅̅ ̅ 
(28) 
Carbon emissions model for both systems can be simply found after using the above 
cost and ordering quantity, Q. Since a new Q that is associated with tax rate value will be 
used to calculate the cost, carbon emissions equation won’t be that same as the previous 
section; it has to change depending on the new ordering quantity value. The new carbon 
emissions equation associated with tax can be as the following: 
For the decentralized system: 
∑ 𝐸𝑡
𝑑 = (
?̂?
?̃?
) ∑
𝑇𝑖
𝑑
2
+  ∑
ℎ̂𝑖
𝐻?̃?
 
𝑇𝑖
𝑑
2
 
(29) 
The total emission for the centralized system: 
𝐸𝑡
𝑐 =  (
?̂?
?̃?
)
𝑇𝑐
∗
2
+
𝑇𝑐
∗
2
 
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝐻𝑖̅̅ ̅
 
(30) 
Equation (29) was derived as the following: 
𝐸𝑑 =  ∑(𝐴 ̂
𝑛
𝐷𝑖
𝑄𝑖
+  ℎ̂𝑖
𝑄𝑖
2
) 
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𝐸𝑑 =  ∑(𝐴 ̂
𝑛
𝐷𝑖
√
2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)𝐷𝑖
ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡ℎ̂𝑖
+ 
ℎ̂𝑖
2
√
2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)𝐷𝑖  
ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡ℎ̂𝑖
  ) 
 
𝐸𝑑 =  ∑(𝐴 ̂
𝑛
𝐷𝑖√ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡ℎ̂𝑖
√2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)𝐷𝑖
+  
ℎ̂𝑖
2
√
2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)𝐷𝑖  
ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡ℎ̂𝑖
  ) 
 
𝐸𝑑 =  ∑(𝐴 ̂
𝑛
𝐷𝑖√2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)𝐷𝑖(ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡ℎ̂𝑖)
2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)𝐷𝑖
+ 
ℎ̂𝑖
2
√2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)𝐷𝑖  (ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡ℎ̂𝑖)
ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡ℎ̂𝑖
  ) 
 
𝐸𝑑 =  ∑( 
?̂?
2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)
 𝑇𝑖
𝑑 + 
ℎ̂𝑖
2(ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡ℎ̂𝑖)𝑛
 𝑇𝑖
𝑑) 
 
As for the centralized system in equation (30), the drive will be the same: 
𝐸𝑐 =  𝐴 ̂
𝐷𝑖
𝑄𝑖
+  
1
𝑓
 
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2
 
𝐸𝑐 =  𝐴 ̂
𝐷𝑖
𝐷𝑖  √
2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
+  
𝐷𝑖  √
2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝐷𝑖
 
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2
 
𝐸𝑐 =  𝐴 ̂
√∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
 √2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)
+  
 √2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)
√∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
 
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2
 
𝐸𝑐 =  𝐴 ̂
√2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)
 2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)
+  
 √2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
 
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2
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𝐸𝑐 =  
?̂?
 2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)
 𝑇𝑐
∗ +   
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)
 𝑇𝑐
∗ 
Having the formulated carbon emission equation within both systems in 29 and 30, 
and after simplifying both models, it can be noticed that the structure of both models will 
have the same structure as the regular model provided in chapter 4. Noticing that, it can 
be predicted that cooperation can also lead to a reduction in carbon emission under tax 
regulation as well. This can be shown and proved in the coming section. 
 
6.2 Comparing cost and carbon emissions in both systems 
 
Previously, the total carbon emission model was formulated with regards to carbon 
tax. Since it was proved in previous chapters that consolidation can reduce both cost and 
carbon emissions, same result can be found if carbon emission tax rate was also added to 
the system. This section is going to show if cooperation can help in reducing cost and 
carbon emissions under carbon tax regulation as well when the incentive of the 
cooperation is to reduce cost only. 
First, the effect on costs in both systems by comparing the total cost equations with 
taxes will be found. From equations (27) and (28), it can be shown that the total cost in 
centralized supply chain with tax will always be less than the total cost with tax in 
decentralized supply chain and it can be proved mathematically. The comparison of both 
systems will be as the following: 
Decentralized formula: Centralized formula:        
74 
 
∑ √2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)𝐷𝑖(ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡 ℎ̂𝑖)
𝑛
         ?         √2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑖⊆𝑁
−  𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)
𝑖⊆𝑁
 
(31) 
∑ √𝐷𝑖(ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡 ℎ̂𝑖)
𝑛
         ≥          √(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑖⊆𝑁
−  𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)
𝑖⊆𝑁
 
(32) 
Based on the above comparison, it is shown that decentralized system will be greater 
than the centralized system. Since the ordering cost part will be emitted because it is 
constant, then the comparison will only be on the holding amount. The holding part under 
centralized system is smaller than holding part in decentralized system. That is because 
the square root of a summation is smaller than the summation of a square root when both 
equations have identical variables. Mathematically, this proves that there will be a 
reducing in cost in a cooperative environment. 
 
 
Figure 6. Affect of tax rate on cost function in both systems 
 
Aside from the formula above, the results from figure (6) shows that operational 
adjustment in the form of joint replenishment can be an advantage to firms if a tax penalty 
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was imposed. By having the cost function to be graphed with relation to the tax rate, it 
shows that the total cost will keep on increasing linearly with the increment of the tax 
rate. On the other hand, in centralized system, the total cost will always re- main smaller 
than the decentralized system even with the incremental of the tax rate and there is a 
sufficient differences between both modules as well. 
Moving to the second part related to saving in carbon emission obtained from the 
carbon emissions models in both systems, from previous chapters, it was shown that 
consolidation was able to reduce the amount of carbon emission within the system. Since 
there is a regulation imposed on supply chain for this part, it will make sense that the 
carbon emission will be less than previous section. This was proved by several researches 
in the literature review section. Most papers agreed that tax rate should be set at a 
reasonable rate in order to get the best result out of it. If the tax rate was set too little, then 
the emission won’t be reduced as much. The same thing can be applied if the tax rate was 
set too high, then the carbon emission reduction will barely be noticeable and can be 
avoided. 
Cooperation can be used to assist in reducing carbon emission from the supply chain 
along with costs as well and under carbon tax regulation, and this can be proved 
theoretically and mathematically. Since the emission under tax regulation has a similar 
structure to the regular emission function formulated in chapter 4, then it is clear that a 
reduction can be applied in the ordering emission part. The amount of carbon emissions 
that are going to be measured for the ordering part depends on the number of frequencies, 
and the number of frequencies will be reduced in the centralized system. The holding 
emissions part will be reduced as well since the company are going to hold less than what 
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they did in the decentralized system since the number of items that had been ordered are 
less. 
Following the above theoretical concept, mathematically, it can be shown that carbon 
emission under tax regulation can be reduced with consolidation even if the firm’s main 
aim is to reduce cost only. 
Proposition 6. Cooperation can always lead to a reduction in carbon emissions under 
tax regulation. 
𝐸𝑑 =  ∑( 
?̂?
2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)
 𝑇𝑖
𝑑 +  
ℎ̂𝑖
2(ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡ℎ̂𝑖)𝑛
 𝑇𝑖
𝑑)  ≥  𝐸𝑐 =  
?̂?
 2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)
 𝑇𝑐
∗ +   
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)
 𝑇𝑐
∗ 
(33) 
Proof: For the current environment where firms will care about cost rather than carbon 
emissions, carbon emissions equations in both systems that was introduced earlier, 
(equations 29 and 30) will be com- pared to find the gap between them. For simplification 
purpose, both equations will be split into ordering and holding to which each of which 
will be compared separately. This is possible since both parts are joint by additional sign. 
The ordering part of the equation is influenced by the total cost in both models. Based 
on the previous prove that the total cost will be reduced under cooperation, this finding 
can be used to prove that the ordering emission will be less in centralized system than the 
decentralized as the following: 
Decentralized formula: Centralized formula:        
∑  
?̂?
2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)
 𝑇𝑖
𝑑      
𝑛
             ?                        
?̂?
 2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)
 𝑇𝑐
∗ 
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∑  
?̂?
2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)
 √2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)𝐷𝑖(ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡 ℎ̂𝑖)        
𝑛
  ?       
?̂?
 2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)
 √2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑖⊆𝑁
−  𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)
𝑖⊆𝑁
 
The ordering costs can be omitted since it is constant, and the formula will be 
equivalent to: 
∑  √𝐷𝑖(ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡 ℎ̂𝑖)           
𝑛
  ≥            √(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑖⊆𝑁
−  𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)
𝑖⊆𝑁
 
From the above comparison, mathematically it is proved that the ordering part will be 
greater in the decentralized system since the ordering emission part is equivalent to the 
cost comparison which was proved earlier. 
After showing that the ordering will always be greater in decentralized system, the 
holding emission can be proved as well by having the following: 
Decentralized formula: Centralized formula:        
∑  
ℎ̂𝑖
2(ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡ℎ?̂?)
 𝑇𝑖
𝑑      
𝑛
             ?                   
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)
 𝑇𝑐
∗ 
∑  
ℎ̂𝑖  √2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)𝐷𝑖(ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡 ℎ̂𝑖)
2(ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡ℎ?̂?)
            
𝑛
  ?           
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛  √2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑖⊆𝑁 −  𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)𝑖⊆𝑁
2(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)
  
To which it is equivalent to the below equation after the omitting of the ordering cost 
as it is constant and adding 
𝐷𝑖
𝐷𝑖
 ratio to the decentralized system for equivalent purpose: 
∑  
ℎ̂𝑖 √2𝐷𝑖(ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡 ℎ̂𝑖)
2(ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡ℎ?̂?)
            
𝑛
  ?           
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛  √2(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑖⊆𝑁 −  𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)𝑖⊆𝑁
2(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)
 
 
∑  
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖 √2𝐷𝑖(ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡 ℎ̂𝑖)
2𝐷𝑖(ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡ℎ?̂?)
            
𝑛
  ?           
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛  √2(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑖⊆𝑁 −  𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)𝑖⊆𝑁
2(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)
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∑  
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖 
√2𝐷𝑖(ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡ℎ?̂?)
            
𝑛
  ?           
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛  
√2(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)
 
 
∑  √
(ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)
2
 
2𝐷𝑖(ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡ℎ?̂?)
            
𝑛
  ?           √
(∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛  )
2
2(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)
 
(34) 
The above equation proved that the holding emission part under centralized system is 
less than the holding emission part under decentralized system with regards to tax rate. 
By proving that both ordering and holding parts can lead to a reduction of carbon 
emissions under cooperation, then the total carbon emissions will be reduced when firms 
consolidate their shipment. From this finding, the delta change in both total cost and total 
emissions can be presented to find the effect of the costs and emissions’ variable on the 
systems. 
The delta change of the cost function and the carbon emissions functions can be 
presented below: Delta change in cost: 
∆𝐶 =  
𝐶𝑡
𝑑 − 𝐶𝑡
𝑐
𝐶𝑡
𝑑  
 
∆𝐶 = 1 −  
 𝐶𝑡
𝑐
𝐶𝑡
𝑑  
 
∆𝐶 = 1 −  
 √2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑖⊆𝑁 −  𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)𝑖⊆𝑁
∑ √2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)𝐷𝑖(ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡 ℎ̂𝑖)
 
 
∆𝐶 = 1 −  
 √(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑖⊆𝑁 −  𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)𝑖⊆𝑁
∑ √𝐷𝑖(ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡 ℎ̂𝑖)
 
(35) 
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Delta change in carbon emissions: 
∆𝐸 =  
𝐸𝑡
𝑑 −  𝐸𝑡
𝑐
𝐸𝑡
𝑑  
(36) 
The delta change in cost between the two systems depends on the ratio 
of√(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑖⊆𝑁 −  𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)𝑖⊆𝑁  over ∑ √𝐷𝑖(ℎ𝑖 + 𝑡 ℎ̂𝑖) since the ordering cost is constant 
in both systems, it won’t have an effect on the change. In other words, neither the ordering 
cost nor ordering emission will have an effect on the saving of cost that will occur from 
consolidation. This can be clearly observed from graph 7. 
 
 
Figure 7. Affect of ordering emissions on the delta change of the cost and carbon emission functions 
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Figure 8. Affect of ordering cost on the delta change of the cost and carbon emission functions 
 
Figure 9. Affect of carbon tax rate on the delta change of the cost and carbon emission functions.  
 
The delta change in carbon emissions and total cost will be compared bases on various 
variables. Both deltas will be plotted based on the changed in ordering emissions, ordering 
cost, and tax rate. Graph 7 shows that ordering emission variable can have an effect on 
the change of carbon emissions but not the change in cost due to having the variable to 
be omitted from the delta change. The greater the emission value will be, the greater the 
delta change in emission will be until it reaches a flat status. The same goes for the 
ordering cost variable in graph 8. The change will be applied to the carbon emissions 
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function only and the change will get on decreasing as the value increases. As for the 
carbon tax rate, the variable will have an effect on both carbon emissions and cost models. 
The affect will be the opposite in both models due to the position of the variable in the 
function. The greater the value is, the delta change in cost will be reduced while the delta 
change in carbon emissions will be increased. This can be shown in graph 9. 
In additions to the graphs, a numerical example can show the amount of carbon 
emissions that had been saved by consolidating the shipment. The numerical example for 
this part is a continuation of the previous scenario. In table 2, all the values for three firms 
were listed of the following variables: Ordering cost and ordering emission, holding cost 
and holding emission, and the demand.  In order to calculate the tax regulation, it was 
assumed that the government set the carbon tax rate, t, to be $0.3 for every unit of carbon 
that had been emitted. Having all these values, the total carbon emission for each firm 
working individually and together will be calculated. The values are randomly generated 
and considered based on previous researches.  
 
Table 4. Numerical example for centralized and decentralized Emissions under tax regulation 
Retailer Ei En 
1 356.3061 - 
2 761.3509 - 
3 1285.348 - 
Total 2403.005 1526.179 
 
A summary of all carbon emission that had been calculated after placing all the values 
into the emission equation are presented in table 4.  Additionally, it can be observed that 
regulations can play a great roles in reducing the carbon emission unit emitted by each 
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firm within the system. Compared to the previous examples, just by having tax rate 
imposed into the system, this can have a great impact on carbon emissions even if the 
incentive is to reduce the total cost.  From the results found in table 2 and table 4, it can 
be seen that carbon emission was reduced in the decentralized system from 4,035.46 to 
2403.005; and in the centralized system, it was reduced from 2.356.57 to 1526.179. This 
means that with imposing a small tax to the system, carbon emissions can be reduced 
significantly. It can also be noticed through graph 10.  
 
 
Figure 10. The effect on the total Carbon Emission with and without tax regulation 
 
 
 
6.3 Carbon Emission Allocation 
 
In order to find a core allocation formula to distribute the carbon emissions among the 
parties in the coalitions, the carbon emissions model under tax regulation will be checked 
if it has the characteristics of a supper-additive coalition. This means that the greater the 
coalition is, the better the saving will be. The carbon emissions function in the centralized 
system donated as (N,E) can be presented as the following and to be tested: 
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𝐸𝑐 =  
?̂?
 2(𝐴 + 𝑡?̂?)
 𝑇𝑐
∗ +   
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)
 𝑇𝑐
∗ 
(37) 
The emission equation has one of the characteristics that is it is a super-additive 
function. It means that firms will do better off if all consolidated their shipment instead 
of having two big groups. 
Proposition 7.  The carbon emission function under tax regulation is supper-additive 
function for all S ⊂ N to which E(S) + E(T ) ≥ E(S ∪ T ), for all S, T ⊂ N and S ∩ T = φ. 
Proof: There is a subset S and T where they are non-empty and disjoint: 
𝐸(𝑠) + 𝐸(𝑇) =
𝐶(𝑠)
2
 (
?̂?
 ?̃?
 +   
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠
2(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠 )
 ) +  
𝐶(𝑇)
2
 (
?̂?
 ?̃?
 +   
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑇
2(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑇 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑇 )
 ) 
=
√2Ã(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑆 −  𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)𝑆
2
 (
?̂?
 ?̃?
 +  
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠
2(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠 )
 ) + 
√2Ã(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑇 −  𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖)𝑇
2
 (
?̂?
 ?̃?
 +  
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑇
2(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑇 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑇 )
 ) 
=
√2Ã
2
(√∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑆
−  𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑆
+ √∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑇
−  𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑇
 ) ((
?̂?
 ?̃?
) +  
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠
2(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠 )
+   
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑇
2(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑇 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑇 )
 ) 
≥
√2Ã
2
(√∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑆⊔𝑇
−  𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑆⊔𝑇
 ) ((
?̂?
 ?̃?
) +  
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑆⊔𝑇
2(∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑆⊔𝑇 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑆⊔𝑇 )
  ) = 𝐸(𝑆 ⊔ 𝑇) 
(38) 
In order to find a core allocation function, the same concept as the previous chapter 
will be followed. Instead of using the usual cost function, it will be changed to the cost 
with regards to frequency. The new cost function with relevance to frequency that is 
associated with the ordering emission will be 2Ã𝑓𝑛, while the one associated with the 
holding emission will be 
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛 +𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
𝑓𝑛
. The new Emission function will be as the 
following: 
𝐸𝑐 =  
?̂?
 ?̃?
 
𝑇𝑐
∗
2
+   
𝑇𝑐
∗
2
[
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
]  
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𝐸𝑐 =  
?̂?
 2?̃?
 (2Ã𝑓𝑛) +   
∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
𝑓𝑛
[
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2 ∑ ℎ𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝑡 ∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
] 
 
𝐸𝑐 =  ?̂?𝑓𝑛 +   
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2𝑓𝑛
 
(39) 
In equation (39) the allocation can be split into two parts, ordering and holding. For 
the ordering part Âfn, the emission will be allocated to be proportionally distributed based 
on the frequency of ordering of each firm. The proportional allocation will be the 
frequency of each firm fi over the overall frequency fn. As for the holding emission, since 
it depends mainly on the amount of the holding emissions, the proportional allocation will 
be distributed based on it. The allocation equation will be as the following: 
𝑋𝑖 =
𝑓𝑖
2 
𝑓𝑛2
?̂?𝑓𝑛 +
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
  
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2𝑓𝑛
 
(40) 
The below proposition proves that the above Xi equation is the core allocation for 
distributing the emitted emissions among all the participated firms in the inventory game: 
Proposition 8.  The 𝑋 = (𝑋𝑖, ..., 𝑋𝑛 ) ∈ ℝ
𝑛 assigned to each retailer i is a core allocation 
for N players. 
Proof: For All i ∈ N, 𝑥𝑖 =  
𝑓𝑖
2
𝑓𝑛
2  ?̂?𝑓𝑛 +  
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
 (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2𝑓𝑛
) in which it satisfies the following: 
1. Individual rationality: for every i ∈ 𝑁, 𝑁𝑁 ≥ 𝑁 . Then 𝑥𝑖 =  
𝑓𝑖
2
𝑓𝑛
2  ?̂?𝑓𝑛 +
 
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
 (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2𝑓𝑛
)  =
√𝑓𝑖
2
√𝑓𝑛
2
 ?̂?𝑓𝑛 +  
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
2𝑓𝑛
=   
𝑓𝑖
𝑓𝑛
 ?̂?𝑓𝑛 +  
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
2𝑓𝑛
=  ?̂?𝑓𝑖 +  
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
2𝑓𝑛
≤  ?̂?𝑓𝑖 +
 
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
2𝑓𝑖
= 𝐸(𝑖).   
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2. Efficiency: X(N) = ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖∈𝑁 = 
∑ 𝑓𝑛 𝑖
2
𝑓𝑛
2  ?̂?𝑓𝑛 +  ∑
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
 (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2𝑓𝑛
) 𝑛 = 
√∑ 𝑓𝑛 𝑖
2
√𝑓𝑛
2
 ?̂?𝑓𝑛 +
 (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2𝑓𝑛
) =  ?̂?𝑓𝑛 + (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2𝑓𝑛
) = 𝐸(𝑛).  
3. Collective rationality: For All 𝜙 ⊂ 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑁,  𝑥𝑠 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑖∈𝑆
∑ 𝑓𝑠 𝑖
2
𝑓𝑛
2  ?̂?𝑓𝑛 +
∑
ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
 (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑛
2𝑓𝑛
)𝑠 = 
∑ 𝑓𝑠 𝑖
2
𝑓𝑛
 ?̂? + (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠
2𝑓𝑛
) =  
√∑ 𝑓𝑠 𝑖
2
√𝑓𝑛
 ?̂? + (
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠
2𝑓𝑛
) ≤  ?̂?𝑓𝑠 +
(
∑ ℎ̂𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠
2𝑓𝑠
) = 𝐸(𝑠) 
The above proposition proves that Xi is a core allocation. All firms within the game 
will like to remain in the game and consolidate its resources because it will have a fair 
distribution of carbon emissions. None of the participated firms will have to emit more 
than what it emits when working individually. Moreover, no subgroup would leave the 
game to form a new one by themselves because they will have to pay more than when 
they are part of the grand coalition. 
 
Table 5. Carbon Emission under tax regulation for the possible consolidation grouping 
E(1) 356.3061 E(2) 761.3509 
E(3) 1285.348 E(1,2) 835.357 
E(1,3) 1323.884 E(2,3) 1491.246 
E(1,2,3) 1526.179 
  
 
The above proposition can be prove by providing a numerical example. Following the 
previous example of carbon emissions in table 2, the total carbon emission will be 
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calculated for all subsets within the games. Since there are three retails, the subset will be 
5 subsets. The total carbon emissions of each subset is summarized in table 5. It shows 
that working all together as a group will reduce the total number of carbon emission. This 
is because the frequency of ordering jointly will be 14 orders/ year, while if each firm 
ordered individually the frequency will be 4.5, 7.5 and 10.9 respectively with a total of 
22.9 orders/year totally. 
The allocation of carbon emission among all firms will be based on the proved carbon 
emissions allocation formula above. The firms will have to allocate the total of 1526.179 
among themselves. As mentioned above, the frequency of ordering will be 14 orders/ year 
and the number of carbon emissions each firm is assigned to will be as the following: X1 
= 115.601, X2 = 403.3736 and X3 = 1007.204; where they used to emit when working 
individually were as the following: X1 = 356.3061, X2 = 1285.348 and X3 = 132.884. 
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CHAPTER 7. CARBON EMISSION UNDER FULL 
TRUCKLOAD SYSTEM.  
 
In this chapter, the model will be extended to handle a more realistic scenario of having 
a fixed order size when placing an order. The research will study the system’s effect on 
the carbon emissions. Section (7.1) presents the formulation of the carbon emission 
formula under full Truckload system and show the finding based on decentralized and 
centralized system. Section (7.2) will present a core allocation of savings. 
 
7.1 Model Formulation and Findings 
 
The regular EOQ model can be modified to handle a more realistic scenarios such as 
full truckload scenario under consolidation. All shipments needs to be fully loaded in 
order to reduce the cost of ordering. Full Truckload means having a fix size when ordering 
which is the size of the truck. (Elomri et al. 2013)’s model will be used and adjusted for 
this thesis. Two models were introduced, one is having a full truckload for a single firm, 
and the second is a consolidated shipments between N firms. The research showed, and 
as it was explained in the literature review, that consolidation can actually reduce the cost 
among the N firms for this system. The question will be for this thesis is whether this 
consolidation will have an effect of carbon emission as well under full truckload system. 
Will carbon emission be reduced or will it be increased. 
The notations for this model are presented as the following: it will be assumed having 
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N firms in both systems, centralized and decentralized. Each firm will have a demand Di. 
The system will deal with one item that is provided to all firms for simplicity purpose. 
The volume of the item will be measured as V for all firms and items. Trucks will be of 
the same size and will carry the same amount of items in it. The capacity of the truck is 
donated as CAP. The ordering cost and operation handling for each truck will be fixed 
and donated as A. The holding cost per item unit will vary from a firm to another and will 
be donated as hi since each firm will hold the quantity in its own warehouse. For 
simplicity purpose, the holding cost will donated as Hi, where Hi = ℎ𝑖
𝑄𝑖
2
.  
In decentralized system where each firm orders separately, the replenishment, Q, of 
each firm will depends on the number of items that will fit into the truck, to which Q will 
be 
𝐶𝐴𝑃
𝑉
. The frequency of ordering will be 
𝐷𝑖
𝑄
 or 
𝐷𝑖𝑉
𝐶𝐴𝑃
. This means that the total ordering 
quantity won’t change from a firm to another. The difference will be in the frequencies 
which represents the number of trucks required. 
The cost for decentralized will be as the following: 
𝐶𝑖 = 𝐴𝑓𝑖 +  
𝐻𝑖
𝑓𝑖
 
(41) 
The cost for the N firms in the decentralized will be basically the summation of Ci for 
every firm i ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑛 = 𝐴 ∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑛 +  ∑
𝐻𝑖
𝑓𝑖
𝑛 .  
For the centralized system where all N firms has to work jointly, the number of 
frequencies which is the number of orders won’t be affected due to having to fully load 
the trucks.  Since the truck has to be   fully loaded, then the number of trucks required 
and trips won’t differ even if they were ordered in a different time period. The frequency 
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formula will simply be A ∑ 𝑓𝑖 = 𝐴 ∑
𝐷𝑖𝑉
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑛𝑛
. The holding cost will be the total number of 
holding for all n firms over the total frequency. That is because the quantity that will be 
held per each firm will be less in consolidation systems than items used to be held in a 
decentralized system. The joint cost will be as following: 
𝐶𝑛 = 𝐴 ∑ 𝑓𝑖
𝑛
+  
∑ 𝐻𝑖𝑛
∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑛
= 𝐴𝑓𝑛 +  
𝐻𝑛
𝑓𝑛
 
(42) 
Following the same concept in previous chapters to formulate carbon emissions 
models, the cost’s variables will be replaced by the emission’s variables. As it was 
introduced, the ordering emission will be donated as A ̂and the holding emissions will be 
donated as ?̂?𝑖, where ?̂?𝑖 =  ℎ̂𝑖
𝑄𝑖
2
. The equation will simply be: 
𝐸𝑖 = ?̂?𝑓𝑖 +  
?̂?𝑖
𝑓𝑖
 
(43) 
And  
𝐸𝑛 = ?̂?𝑓𝑛 +  
?̂?𝑛
𝑓𝑛
 
(44) 
In order to measure the amount of carbon emissions emitted from both decentralized 
and centralized systems where firm consolidated their shipment for a better performance 
and to reduce cost, the optimum frequencies that optimize the total cost will be used in 
the emission function to show the effect of cooperation on carbon emissions.  The cost 
model uses a fixed ordering quantity to which it is calculated as the capacity of the truck 
over the volume of one item. It is the quantity needed to fill out one truck to which any 
order cannot exceed the size of the truck which is the ordering quantity, and at the same 
time cannot be less than the truck size as well. Since the order quantity is fixed, the 
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frequency will remain the same in carbon emission model. For that, the emission equation 
will have the same structure presented in 43 and 44,  with the introduced frequencies 
𝐷𝑖 𝑉
𝐶𝐴𝑃
. 
It means that the emission equation won’t be affected by the ordering nor the holding 
costs. 
Since the amount of carbon emissions won’t be affected by the costs values, and the 
order quantity and frequencies will be the same in both the cost and carbon emissions 
model, then the carbon emissions under centralized system will always be less than the 
total carbon emissions in decentralized system. This can be shown in the below 
proposition. 
Proposition 9. Cooperation can always lead to a reduction to carbon emissions. 
𝐸𝑖 = ?̂?𝑓𝑖 +  
?̂?𝑖
𝑓𝑖
     ≥       𝐸𝑛 = ?̂?𝑓𝑛 +  
?̂?𝑛
𝑓𝑛
 (45) 
Proof: From the above equation, both carbon emissions model can be split into two 
parts: ordering and holding emission. Each part will be proved separately that it can lead 
to a reduction. From the ordering emissions part, the number of frequencies are the same 
in both systems since the order should be based on the truck size. Additionally, since the 
ordering emission variable is constant, then both system will have an exact equal account 
of carbon emissions emitted from ordering process. 
Decentralized formula: Centralized formula:        
∑  ?̂?𝑓
𝑖
      
𝑛
             ?                   ?̂?𝑓
𝑛
 
Moving to the holding emission part, mathematically the model can be proved that 
decentralization will emit more carbon emissions from the system than centralization and 
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this can be seen below. Theoretically, that is because the average number of the holding 
items will be less in centralized system since firms are going to order jointly and the 
quantity will be spilt among the firms in the coalition. 
∑ (
?̂?𝑖
𝑓𝑖
)           ≥         
?̂?𝑛
𝑓𝑛
   
𝑛
 
The summation of a division is mathematically larger than the sum of variable A over 
sum of variable b. 
 
 
Figure 11. Affect of Ordering emissions on two systems under FTL system 
 
 
Figure 12. Affect of Holding emissions on two systems under FTL system 
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Figure 13. Affect of Holding emissions on two systems under FTL system.  
 
The above proposition cab be presented in graphs to which these graphs will show the 
effect of each emission variable on carbon emissions in both systems and the difference 
obtained. Graph 11 shows the effect of ordering emissions on both models. The greater 
the ordering emission will be, the greater the carbon emissions emitted from both systems 
will be. The centralized system will emit less than the decentralized system even with the 
increment of the variable. However, the difference between the both systems or the 
savings won’t be affected by the increment of ordering emissions. Secondly, the effect of 
holding emissions is presented in graph 12. The centralized system will do a better off 
than the decentralized system. The greater the value will be, the greater the carbon 
emissions will be. Moreover, the difference between both systems will differ and starts to 
increase with the increment of holding emissions’ value. Lastly, chancing the truck 
capacity size; the change in this value can have an effect on carbon emissions in both 
systems and the difference between them. The greater the value will be, carbon emissions 
will be reduced in both systems, but the amount emitted from the centralized system will 
always be lower.  
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Table 6. Numerical example for centralized and decentralized carbon emissions in FTL system 
Retailer Di CAP V Aˆ hˆi Ei En 
1 100 30 2 300 20 350 - 
2 800 30 2 300 10 1675 - 
3 700 30 2 300 30 1625 - 
  Total    3650 3345.31 
 
 
A numerical example based on the above proposal can be found in table 6. The table 
shows that carbon emission can be reduced when firms starts to work jointly. Based on 
the provided values which were generated in random, the decentralized system will emit 
around 3650 carbon emissions throughout its process; while in the centralized system, the 
total carbon emissions emitted will be 3345.31. The saving obtained from cooperation for 
this scenario will be around 304.69 carbon emissions.  
 
7.2 Carbon Emission Allocation 
 
Since it was proved that shipment consolidation, cooperation, can lead to a saving in 
the total carbon emissions, this savings can be allocation and shared among the n parties 
in the grand coalition. Before moving to allocate the savings, it will be proved that the 
total carbon emissions is a supper-additive model. This means that no matter how large 
the coalition is, the players will do better off if they joint a larger group (grand coalition). 
The greater the group will be, the greater the savings will be. The following proposition 
will show the mathematically proof: 
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Proposition 10. The emission function is supper-additive function for all S ⊂ N to which 
E(S)+ E(T ) ≥ E(S ∪ T ), for all S, T ⊂ N and S ∩ T = φ. 
 
Proof: there is a subset S and T where they are non-empty and disjoint: 
𝐸(𝑆) + 𝐸(𝑇) =  ?̂? ∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑠 +  
∑ 𝐻?̂?𝑠
∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑠
+ ?̂? ∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑇 +  
∑ 𝐻?̂?𝑇
∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑇
  =  ?̂?(∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑠 + ∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑇 ) + ( 
∑ 𝐻?̂?𝑠
∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑠
+
 
∑ 𝐻?̂?𝑇
∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑇
)     ≥   ?̂? ∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑠⊔𝑇 + 
∑ 𝐻?̂?𝑠⊔𝑇
∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑠⊔𝑇
 = E(𝑠 ⊔ 𝑇) 
After proving that the model is supper-additive and since there is a saving, the next 
step will be finding a formula to allocate the carbon emissions among the n players in the 
grand coalition. Having the total carbon emissions model, formula 44, the model can be 
divided into two parts, ordering and holding emissions. For the ordering emission part, 
and referring to previous section, it was proved that the amount of ordering emission is 
equal in both centralized and decentralized system since the amount of items to be ordered 
is fixed due to having the truck size so the frequency will be the same. For that, all firms 
will have to be charged the same amount when they are working separately or jointly. 
The ordering emission for each firm will be ?̂?𝑓𝑖 where 𝑓𝑖 =  
𝐷𝑖𝑉
𝐶𝐴𝑃
 and 𝑓𝑛 =  ∑ 𝑓𝑖.  
As for the holding emission part, the amount of items to be held will depend of the 
total number of items ordered in each replenishment of all firms. Which means that the 
number of items to be held will be less when ordering jointly. Each firm will be charged 
for 
?̂?𝑖
∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑛
 and where ?̂?𝑛 =  ∑ ?̂?𝑖. 
The cost allocation function for firm i will be as the following: 
𝑋𝑖 = ?̂?𝑓𝑖 +  
?̂?𝑖
∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑛
  (46) 
The above equation can be proved that it is a core allocation in the following 
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proposition: 
Proposition 11.  The 𝑋 = (𝑋𝑖, ..., 𝑋𝑛 ) ∈ ℝ
𝑛 assigned to each retailer i is a core allocation 
for N players. 
Proof: For All i ∈ N, 𝑋𝑖 = ?̂?𝑓𝑖 +  
?̂?𝑖
∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑛
 in which it satisfies the following: 
1. Individual rationality: for every i ∈ 𝑁, 𝑁𝑁 ≥ 𝑁 . Then 𝑋𝑖 =  ?̂?𝑓𝑖 +  
?̂?𝑖
∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑛
  ≤  ?̂?𝑓𝑖 +
 
?̂?𝑖
𝑓𝑖
  = 𝐸(𝑖)   
2. Efficiency: X(N) = ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑖∈𝑁 = ∑ ?̂?𝑓𝑖 + 
?̂?𝑖
∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑛
 𝑛 =  ?̂? ∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑛 +  
∑ 𝐻?̂?𝑛
∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑛
=  ?̂?𝑓𝑛 +  
?̂?𝑛
𝑓𝑛
=
𝐸(𝑁)  
3. Collective rationality: For All 𝜙 ⊂ 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑁, 𝑋𝑠 =  ∑ ?̂?𝑓𝑖 +  
?̂?𝑖
∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑛
 𝑠 = ?̂?𝑓𝑠 +  
?̂?𝑠
𝑓𝑛
≤   ?̂?𝑓𝑠 +
 
?̂?𝑠
𝑓𝑠
= 𝐸(𝑆).   
The above allocation function was proved to be a core allocation function. The carbon 
emission function of each firm will depend of the frequency and the holding emissions 
values. The proposition showed that the provided formula follows the properties of a core 
allocation. It was proved that cooperation can actually have a firm to do a better off than 
when working individually. It was also proved that the formula assures that the all the 
costs will be distributed among the players and that the players will do better in the grand 
coalition than when working in a sub coalition. 
The difference between this model and previous models is that the ordering quantity 
is fixed, for that the emission function structure will be identical to cost function. Since 
the ordering quantity is fixed, the emission function won’t be affected by the ordering and 
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holding cost at all, and will be only affected by the ordering, holding emission and truck 
size (CAP) variables. Moreover, the savings will only be obtained from the holding 
emission amount. 
 
Table 7. Emission under Full Truckload of the possible consolidation grouping 
 
E(1) 350 E(2) 1675 
E(3) 1625 E(1,2) 188.33 
E(1,3) 1815.63 E(2,3) 3145 
E(1,2,3) 3345.31  
 
 
A numerical example is provided to show that the X is a core allocation. Following 
the previous example of carbon emissions in table 6, the total carbon emission can be 
calculated for all subsets within the games which are 5 subsets. The total carbon emissions 
of each subset is summarized in table 7. As it was shown previously, the ordering 
frequency will remain unchanged for both systems. The Total number of orders will be 
106.67 orders where retailer 1 will place 6.67 orders, retailer 2 will place 53.33 orders 
and retailer 3 will place 46.67 orders. 
The allocation of carbon emission among all firms will be based on the core allocation 
of the carbon emission formula above. The firms will have to allocate the total of 
3345.313 among themselves. The number of carbon emissions that has to be emitted by 
each firm will be: X1 = 209.375, X2 = 1637.5 and X3 = 1498.438 which is less than when 
these firms used to pay individually. Firms used to pay in the decentralized system as he 
following: E1: 350, E2: 1675 and E3: 1625.  
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
 
Carbon emissions reduction efforts gained a considerable attention in the past few 
decades. The reduction effort of carbon emissions can be costly when applied to supply 
chain systems. To that end, having a balance between cost and environmental can be hard 
to achieve in many cases. Many firms tend to find a balance between both parameters by 
complying with carbon emissions requirements and maintaining the allocated budget. The 
aim of this thesis follows a different bath where the main objective is to show the effect 
on carbon emission under joint replenishment where n players cooperate and share their 
resources in order to reduce the total cost from the supply chain. In view of this, the thesis 
seeks to develop a model to measure the amount of carbon emissions that is being emitted 
by both centralized and decentralized systems and understand the influence of 
cooperation on carbon emissions. Regular EOQ model, and carbon emissions equation 
were all used to build the model. by showing that cooperation can lead to a reduction in 
carbon emissions along with cost, the thesis aims to develop a core allocation model that 
helps in distributing and allocating the payoffs of carbon emissions among the n parties 
within the coalition by using inventory game techniques,. Furthermore, the allocation 
model can address the three cases covered by this research: regular cooperative EOQ 
model, extended model with fixed tax rate regulation, and extended model with full 
truckload model. 
The first question in this thesis was pertaining to finding the effect on carbon emissions 
under cooperation context. Results of comparing centralized and decentralized system for 
the three cases showed that centralized system always lead to a reduction in carbon 
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emissions. Additionally, indicate that companies can benefit from reducing the total cost 
and the total carbon emissions when joining resources with other companies. 
The Second question in this thesis was pertaining to savings allocation. To have an 
effective cooperation, the coalition game should be fair for all parties so that no entity 
will have an incentive to leave the coalition. The thesis proved that the developed 
allocation model is a core allocation model in which ad- dresses all required 
characteristics. Moreover, the thesis demonstrated that the model used in centralized 
system to measure the amount of carbon emissions is actually a supper additive formula.     
Therefore, the developed allocation model can be seen as a fair and stable model which 
will encourage companies to join and stay in the game. 
Other findings include the relation between ordering and holding costs variables in the 
three models. Ordering and holding costs variables seem to have a direct influence on 
both the regular model and extended model with fix tax rate regulation in terms of carbon 
emissions. Conversely, the full truckload carbon emissions calculation model was not 
affected by the cost variables as the order quantity is fixed. 
The findings and conclusion can encourage firms to form and assess coalitions and 
outcomes by using the models and evaluating the reduction in cost and carbon emissions 
as well as by understanding saving allocation which in turn creates more attractive 
conditions for cooperation. It can also assist firms to show the amount of carbon emission 
omitted during the process to increase customer satisfaction levels. Furthermore, the 
findings can be used by decision makers, governments, entities, and related firms in order   
to measure carbon emissions omitted from the supply chain. The measurement can help 
in defining the carbon caps, tax rates or any other regulations within the system. Even 
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though two extended models were presented, the results may not remain constant based 
on the models used or the type of extension. 
 
8.1 Future Work and Extended Models: 
 
The model can be extended to handle different scenarios and more costs and 
regulations. It can be sophisticated by adding the backorders at each period of time and 
can be more realistic by including the setup and purchase costs. Adding fixed costs to the 
model may or may not have a change in the overall structure of the model and it may 
follow the same findings and results obtained in this thesis. 
Another type of extension can be considering the model under a variable ordering 
emissions or a fixed holding emissions. The model can handle a fixed ordering cost to be 
applied to all firms and a variable unit cost that varies from a firm to another. The structure 
of the model will differ and it may not have the same structure. This is an interesting 
extension to which it considers the destination difference for each firms and the delivery 
method used. This extended model can lead to another question that can be consider 
which is how to measure the increase of ordered items within a replenishment period. If 
more trucks are needed or bigger ones, then this means that the ordering emissions will 
change and cannot be treated as the regular one. To have a fixed holding emissions is 
when firms joints their warehouses and stores in the cheapest warehouse. 
The regular model can be extended to handle multiple items or multiple suppliers or 
to add suppliers to the model. The model can be enhanced to handle the three scenarios: 
multi items ordered by a single retailer, or single item ordered from multi suppliers, or 
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multi items and multi suppliers. Having a multi items system with a single retailer, or 
multi suppliers and a single item can have the same structure. The more sophisticated 
model can be having a multi suppliers and retailers and items. Another type will be adding 
the supplier to the model, the whole structure and concept of supply chain will change. In 
this model, the supplier’s influence and decisions can play a major role to the orders and 
the total costs. 
Lastly, an interesting point can be considered if the system is not fully an enclosed 
system. Currently, the holding cost is an enclosed information which is not shared by 
firms. A future work can be done to have an allocation emission function where is requires 
firms to share all of their information truthfully such as holding costs, or maybe ordering 
variable and this depends on the model. 
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